### 1nc

#### A. Interpretation - Economic Engagement is defined as expanding economic ties with a country to change its behavior – this means they have to be gov to gov

**Kahler, 6** - Graduate School of International Relations and Pacific Studies, University of California, San Diego (M., “Strategic Uses of Economic Interdependence: Engagement Policies on the Korean Peninsula and Across the Taiwan Strait” in Journal of Peace Research (2006), 43:5, p. 523-541, Sage Publications)

Economic engagement - a policy of deliberately expanding economic ties with an adversary in order to change the behavior of the target state and improve bilateral political relations

####  ‘Its’ is a possessive pronoun showing ownership

**Glossary of English Grammar Terms, 2005** – (“Term: Possessive Pronoun,”

http://www.usingenglish.com/glossary/possessive-pronoun.html)

Mine, yours, his, hers, its, ours, theirs are the possessive pronouns used to substitute a noun and to show possession or ownership.

EG. This is your disk and that's mine. (Mine substitutes the word disk and shows that it belongs to me.)

### 1nc

#### Immigration will pass now – momentum

**Parnes 10/18**

Amie, The Hill, Obama’s hollow debt victory, 10/18/13, http://thehill.com/homenews/administration/329219-obamas-hollow-debt-victory

Another former White House official saw things differently and argued Obama now has a real shot at securing a victory on the immigration bill.¶ “The trick here is to capitalize on the moment without spiking the football,” the former official said. “On immigration, if he could tailor what he’s doing as part of functionality and not as politics, that would be key."¶ Cal Jillson, a professor of political science at Southern Methodist University said Obama could capitalize on the victory simply by seizing on a Republican Party “in disarray.”¶ On immigration, “it’s a question of whether he can develop the issue in such a way that that it’ll give them little choice,” Jillson said, adding that Obama “can make the argument that it is critical in a number of ways.”

#### Liberalizing policy towards Cuba costs capital – Congress will upset other items on the agenda

**LeoGrande 12**

William, School of Public Affairs @ American University, Fresh Start for a Stale Policy: Can Obama Break the Stalemate in U.S.-Cuban Relations?, 2012, http://www.american.edu/clals/upload/LeoGrande-Fresh-Start.pdf

Where in the executive branch will control over Cuba policy lie? Political considerations¶ played a major role in Obama's Cuba policy during the first term, albeit not as preeminent a¶ consideration as they were during the Clinton years. In 2009, Obama's new foreign policy team¶ got off to a bad start when they promised Senator Menendez that they would consult him before¶ changing Cuba policy. That was the price he extracted for providing Senate Democrats with the¶ 60 votes needed to break a Republican filibuster on a must-pass omnibus appropriations bill to¶ keep the government operating. For the next four years, administration officials worked more¶ closely with Menendez, who opposed the sort of major redirection of policy Obama had¶ promised, than they did with senators like John Kerry (D-Mass.), chair of the Foreign Relations¶ Committee, whose views were more in line with the president's stated policy goals.¶ At the Department of State, Assistant Secretary Arturo Valenzuela favored initiatives to¶ improve relations with Cuba, but he was stymied by indifference or resistance elsewhere in the¶ bureaucracy. Secretary Hillary Clinton, having staked out a tough position Cuba during the¶ Democratic primary campaign, was not inclined to be the driver for a new policy. At the NSC,¶ Senior Director for the Western Hemisphere Dan Restrepo, who advised Obama on Latin¶ America policy during the 2008 campaign, did his best to avoid the Cuba issue because it was so¶ fraught with political danger. ¶ When the president finally approved the resumption of people-to-people travel to Cuba,¶ which Valenzuela had been pushing, the White House political team delayed the announcement¶ for several months at the behest of Debbie Wasserman Schultz. Any easing of the travel¶ regulations, she warned, would hurt Democrats' prospects in the upcoming mid-term elections.43¶ The White House shelved the new regulations until January 2011, and then announced them late¶ Friday before a holiday weekend. Then, just a year later, the administration surrendered to¶ Senator Rubio's demand that it limit the licensing of travel providers in exchange for him¶ dropping his hold on the appointment of Valenzuela's replacement.44¶ With Obama in his final term and Vice-President Joe Biden unlikely to seek the¶ Democratic nomination in 2016 (unlike the situation Clinton and Gore faced in their second¶ term), politics will presumably play a less central role in deciding Cuba policy over the next four¶ years. There will still be the temptation, however, to sacrifice Cuba policy to mollify¶ congressional conservatives, both Democrat and Republican, who are willing to hold other¶ Obama initiatives hostage to extract concessions on Cuba. And since Obama has given in to such¶ hostage-taking previously, the hostage-takers have a strong incentive to try the same tactic again.¶ The only way to break this cycle would be for the president to stand up to them and refuse to give¶ in, as he did when they attempted to rollback his 2009 relaxation of restrictions on CubanAmerican travel and remittances.¶ Much will depend on who makes up Obama's new foreign policy team, especially at the¶ Department of State. John Kerry has been a strong advocate of a more open policy toward Cuba,¶ and worked behind the scenes with the State Department and USAID to clean up the "democracy¶ promotion" program targeting Cuba, as a way to win the release of Alan Gross. A new secretary¶ is likely to bring new assistant secretaries, providing an opportunity to revitalize the Bureau of¶ Western Hemisphere Affairs, which has been thoroughly cowed by congressional hardliners. But¶ even with new players in place, does Cuba rise to the level of importance that would justify a¶ major new initiative and the bruising battle with conservatives on the Hill? Major policy changes¶ that require a significant expenditure of political capital rarely happen unless the urgency of the¶ problem forces policymakers to take action.

#### Capital is key – allows Obama to thread the needle – there’s momemtum now

**McMorris-Santoro 10/15**

Evan, BuzzFeed Staff, Obama Has Already Won The Shutdown Fight And He’s Coming For Immigration Next, 10/15/13, http://www.buzzfeed.com/evanmcsan/obama-has-already-won-the-shutdown-fight-and-hes-coming-for

As the fiscal fight roiling Washington nears its end, the White House is already signaling that it plans to use the political momentum it has gained during the shutdown fight to charge back into the immigration debate. And this time, Democratic pollsters and advocates say, they could actually win.¶ The final chapter of the current crisis hasn’t been written yet, but Democrats in Washington are privately confident that they’ll emerge with the upper hand over the conservatives in Congress who forced a government shutdown. And sources say the administration plans to use its victory to resurrect an issue that was always intended to be a top priority of Obama’s second-term agenda.¶ Advocates argue the post-fiscal crisis political reality could thaw debate on the issue in the House, which froze in earlier this year after the Senate passed a bipartisan immigration bill that was led by Republican Sen. Marco Rubio and Democratic Sen. Chuck Schumer.¶ “It’s at least possible with sinking poll numbers for the Republicans, with a [GOP] brand that is badly damaged as the party that can’t govern responsibly and is reckless that they’re going to say, ‘All right, what can we do that will be in our political interest and also do tough things?’” said Frank Sharry, executive director of the immigration reform group America’s Voice. “That’s where immigration could fill the bill.”¶ The White House and Democrats are “ready” to jump back into the immigration fray when the fiscal crises ends, Sharry said. And advocates are already drawing up their plans to put immigration back on the agenda — plans they’ll likely initiate the morning after a fiscal deal is struck.¶ “We’re talking about it. We want to be next up and we’re going to position ourselves that way,” Sharry said. “There are different people doing different things, and our movement will be increasingly confrontational with Republicans, including civil disobedience. A lot of people are going to say, ‘We’re not going to wait.’”¶ The White House isn’t ready to talk about the world after the debt limit fight yet, but officials have signaled strongly they want to put immigration back on the agenda.¶ Asked about future strategic plans after the shutdown Monday, a senior White House official said, “That’s a conversation for when the government opens and we haven’t defaulted.” But on Tuesday, Press Secretary Jay Carney specifically mentioned immigration when asked “how the White House proceeds” after the current fracas is history.¶ “Just like we wish for the country, for deficit reduction, for our economy, that the House would follow the Senate’s lead and pass comprehensive immigration reform with a big bipartisan vote,” he said. “That might be good for the Republican Party. Analysts say so; Republicans say so. We hope they do it.”¶ The president set immigration as his next priority in an interview with Univision Tuesday.¶ “Once that’s done, you know, the day after, I’m going to be pushing to say, call a vote on immigration reform,” Obama said. He also set up another fight with the House GOP on the issue.¶ “We had a very strong Democratic and Republican vote in the Senate,” Obama said. “The only thing right now that’s holding it back is, again, Speaker Boehner not willing to call the bill on the floor of the House of Representatives.”¶ Don’t expect the White House effort to include barnstorming across the country on behalf of immigration reform in the days after the fiscal crisis ends, reform proponents predict. Advocates said the White House has tried hard to help immigration reform along, and in the current climate that means trying to thread the needle with Republicans who support reform but have also reflexively opposed every one of Obama’s major policy proposals.¶ Democrats and advocates seem to hope the GOP comes back to immigration on its own, albeit with a boost from Democrats eager to join them. Polls show Republicans have taken on more of the blame from the fiscal battle of the past couple of weeks. But Tom Jensen, a pollster with the Democratic firm Public Policy Polling, said moving to pass immigration reform could be just what the doctor ordered to get the public back on the side of the Republicans.¶ “We’ve consistently found that a sizable chunk of Republican voters support immigration reform, and obviously a decent number of Republican politicians do too,” Jensen said. “After this huge partisan impasse, they may want to focus on something that’s not quite as polarized, and immigration would certainly fit the bill since we see voters across party lines calling for reform.”

#### Immigration k2 biotech

**Dahms 3**, (executive director of the California State University System Biotechnology Program (CSUPERB); chair of the Workforce Committee, Biotechnology Industry Organization; and a member of the ASBMB Education and Professional Development Committee, (A. Stephen, “ Foreign Scientists Seen Essential to U.S. Biotechnology,” in Pan-Organizational Summit on the U.S. Science and Engineering Workforce: Meeting Summary, National Academy of Sciences, <http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/bookshelf/picrender.fcgi?book=nap10727&blobtype=pdf>)

The scarcity of skilled technicians is seen by the biotechnology industry in the U.S. and Canada as one of its most serious challenges. The success of this industry is dependent on the quality of its workforce, and the skills and talents of highly trained people are recognized as one of the most vital and dynamic sources of competitive advantage. The U.S. biotechnology industry workforce has been growing 14 to 17 percent annually over the last six years and is now over 190,000 and conservatively estimated to reach 500,000 by 2012. Despite efforts by the industry to encourage U.S. institutions to increase the production of needed specialists, a continual shortfall in the needed expertise requires access to foreign workers. Foreign workers with unique skills that are scarce in the U.S. can get permission to stay in the U.S. for up to six years under the H1B classification, after which they can apply for permanent resident status. There are currently over 600,000 foreign workers in this category across all industries, and they are critical to the success and global competitiveness of this nation. Of these H-1B visa holders, 46 percent are from India and 10 percent are from China, followed in descending order by Canada, Philippines, Taiwan, Korea, Japan, U.K., Pakistan, and the Russian Federation. Our annual national surveys have demonstrated that between 6 and 10 percent of the biotechnology workforce have H-1B visas. The constant shortfall in specialized technical workers that has been experienced by the biotechnology industry over the past six years has been partially alleviated by access to talented individuals from other nations. However, the industry’s need is sufficient to justify a 25 percent increase in H-1Bs in 2004. Biotechnology industry H-1B visa holders are mainly in highly sought after areas such as analytical chemistry, instrumentation specialization, organic synthesis, product safety and surveillance, clinical research/biostatistics, bio/pharm quality, medicinal chemistry, product scale-up, bioinformatics and applied genomics, computer science, cheminformatics, pharmacokinetics, and pharmacodynamics. Forty percent of H-1B foreign workers are at the Ph.D. level, 35 percent M.S., 20 percent B.S., and 5 percent M.D. In comparison, the U.S. biotechnology industry technical workforce is estimated to be 19 percent Ph.D., 17 percent M.S., 50 percent B.S., and 14 percent combined voc-ed/ community college trained. These and other survey data by industry human resource groups clearly show that the H-1B worker skills match the most pressing employment needs of the biotechnology industry. The data demonstrate that maintaining a reasonably-sized H-1B cap is critical to the industry. Although the national annual H-1B visa cap was raised from 115,000 to 195,000 in the 106th Congress via S. 2045, the cap has already been exceeded. The increased cap remains in effect until 2003 and efforts are under way to ensure that it remains high. The Third Annual National Survey of H-1Bs in the biotechnology industry found that 80 percent are from U.S. universities, and 85 percent of those eventually get green cards. Companies now spend, on average, $10,200 in processing fees and legal expenses to obtain each green card, an estimated cost to the industry of more than $150 million over the past 5 years. In the wake of the 9/11 World Trade Center attacks, debate has been focused on more restrictions on foreign students, a development that would have a severe impact upon the competitiveness of the U.S. biotechnology industry. Clearly, the H-1B route provides a temporary solution to shortages in the national and domestic biotechnology labor pools, shortages mirroring the inadequate production of appropriately trained U.S. nationals by U.S. institutions of higher learning. The reality is that universities have inadequate resources for expanding the training pipeline, particularly in the specialized areas of the research phase of company product development. Efforts should be directed toward influencing greater congressional and federal agency attention to these important topics.

#### Extinction

**Trewavas, 2K** – Institute of Cell and Molecular Biology at the University of Edinburgh
(Anthony, “GM Is the Best Option We Have,” 6/5/2000, [www.agbioworld.org/biotech-info/articles/biotech-art/best\_option.html](http://www.agbioworld.org/biotech-info/articles/biotech-art/best_option.html))

In 535A.D. a volcano near the present **Krakatoa** exploded with the force of 200 million Hiroshima A bombs. The dense cloud of dust so reduced the intensity of the sun that for at least two years thereafter, summer turned to winter and crops here and elsewhere in the Northern hemisphere failed completely. The population survived by hunting a rapidly vanishing population of edible animals. The after-effects continued for a decade and human history was changed irreversibly. But the planet recovered. Such examples of benign nature's wisdom, in full flood as it were, dwarf and make miniscule the tiny modifications we make upon our environment. There are apparently 100 such volcanoes round the world that could at any time unleash forces as great. And even smaller volcanic explosions change our climate and can easily threaten the security of our food supply. Our hold on this planet is tenuous. In the present day an equivalent 535A.D. explosion would **destroy** much of our **civilisation**. Only those with agricultural technology sufficiently advanced would have a chance at survival. Colliding **asteroids** are another problem that requires us to be forward-looking accepting that technological advance may be **the only buffer between** us and **annihilation**. When people say to me they do not need GM, I am astonished at their prescience, their ability to read a benign future in a crystal ball that I cannot. Now is the time to experiment; not when a holocaust is upon us and it is too late. GM is a technology whose time has come and just in the nick of time. With each billion that mankind has added to the planet have come technological advances to increase food supply. In the 18th century, the start of agricultural mechanisation; in the 19th century knowledge of crop mineral requirements, the eventual Haber Bosch process for nitrogen reduction. In the 20th century plant genetics and breeding, and later the green revolution. Each time population growth has been sustained without enormous loss of life through starvation even though crisis often beckoned. For the 21st century, genetic manipulation is our **primary hope** to maintain developing and complex technological civilisations. When the **climate is changing** in unpredictable ways, diversity in agricultural technology is a strength and a necessity not a luxury. Diversity helps secure our food supply. We have heard much of the **precautionary principle** in recent years; my version of it is "be prepared".

### 1nc

#### Text: The United States federal government should condition normalizing trade relations on the Republic of Cuba agreeing to implement environmental regulations in Cuba

#### Conditioning the Embargo on Environmental protection solves the aff - is key to environmental leadership. Lifting the embargo alone dooms the environment.

**Connell 9** – Council of Hemispheric Affairs research associate (Christina, COHA, “The US and Cuba: Destined to be an environmental duo?” 2009, <http://www.coha.org/the-us-and-cuba-an-environmental-duo/>) //RGP

Unlike the U.S., which still has never ratified the Kyoto Protocol, Cuba signed the document in 1997, which calls for the stabilization of greenhouse gas concentrations in the atmosphere at a level that would prevent dangerous interference with the global climate system. This legally binding international agreement attempts to tackle the issue of global warming and the reduction of greenhouse gas emissions. The U.S., although a signatory of the Kyoto Protocol, has neither ratified nor withdrawn from the Protocol. The signature alone is merely symbolic, as the Kyoto Protocol is non-binding on the United States unless ratified. Although in 2005 the United States was the largest per capita emitter of carbon dioxide from the burning of fossil fuels, it experienced only a modest decline of 2.8 percent from 2007 to 2008. This decline demonstrates that the U.S. has the framework to reverse Cuba’s substandard environmental track record. By aiding Havana, Washington would be able to brand itself as an active conservationist. Such a label would enable the U.S. to create a valuable ecological public image in the international arena. The developmental assistance and economic growth potential that might stem from a U.S.-Cuba partnership might aid in developing enforceable implementation strategies. Even though Cuba’s written regulations characteristically lack feasible, implementable standards. Cuban laws, currently in effect, do provide a foundation for greater conservation activity in the future. The Cuban government does show an interest in encouraging sustainable development initiatives in the future, yet its laws are all based on maintaining a centralized government featuring a command economy. For example, CITMA appears to be trying to affect change, but many aspects of Cuba’s bureaucracy are rooted in the past and it remains difficult to update the ways of an outdated administrative substructure. If the embargo is lifted without a robust partnership and plans for environmental sustainability, the invasion of U.S. consumerism may seriously damage the island.

#### The impact is extinction – its linear

**Diner 94** – Judge Advocate’s General’s Corps of US Army

[David N., Military Law Review, Winter, 143 Mil. L. Rev. 161, LN]

No species has ever dominated its fellow species as man has. In most cases, people have assumed the God-like power of life and death -- extinction or survival -- over the plants and animals of the world. For most of history, mankind pursued this domination with a single-minded determination to master the world, tame the wilderness, and exploit nature for the maximum benefit of the human race. n67 In past mass extinction episodes, as many as ninety percent of the existing species perished, and yet the world moved forward, and new species replaced the old. So why should the world be concerned now? The prime reason is the world's survival. Like all animal life, humans live off of other species. At some point, the number of species could decline to the point at which the ecosystem fails, and then humans also would become extinct. No one knows how many [\*171] species the world needs to support human life, and to find out -- by allowing certain species to become extinct -- would not be sound policy. In addition to food, species offer many direct and indirect benefits to mankind. n68 2. Ecological Value. -- Ecological value is the value that species have in maintaining the environment. Pest, n69 erosion, and flood control are prime benefits certain species provide to man. Plants and animals also provide additional ecological services -- pollution control, n70 oxygen production, sewage treatment, and biodegradation. n71 3. Scientific and Utilitarian Value. -- Scientific value is the use of species for research into the physical processes of the world. n72 Without plants and animals, a large portion of basic scientific research would be impossible. Utilitarian value is the direct utility humans draw from plants and animals. n73 Only a fraction of the [\*172] earth's species have been examined, and mankind may someday desperately need the species that it is exterminating today. To accept that the snail darter, harelip sucker, or Dismal Swamp southeastern shrew n74 could save mankind may be difficult for some. Many, if not most, species are useless to man in a direct utilitarian sense. Nonetheless, they may be critical in an indirect role, because their extirpations could affect a directly useful species negatively. In a closely interconnected ecosystem, the loss of a species affects other species dependent on it. n75 Moreover, as the number of species decline, the effect of each new extinction on the remaining species increases dramatically. n76 4. Biological Diversity. -- The main premise of species preservation is that diversity is better than simplicity. n77 As the current mass extinction has progressed, the world's biological diversity generally has decreased. This trend occurs within ecosystems by reducing the number of species, and within species by reducing the number of individuals. Both trends carry serious future implications. Biologically diverse ecosystems are characterized by a large number of specialist species, filling narrow ecological niches. These ecosystems inherently are more stable than less diverse systems. "The more complex the ecosystem, the more successfully it can resist a stress. . . . [l]ike a net, in which each knot is connected to others by several strands, such a fabric can resist collapse better than a simple, unbranched circle of threads -- which if cut anywhere breaks down as a whole." n79 By causing widespread extinctions, humans have artificially simplified many ecosystems. As biologic simplicity increases, so does the risk of ecosystem failure. The spreading Sahara Desert in Africa, and the dustbowl conditions of the 1930s in the United States are relatively mild examples of what might be expected if this trend continues. Theoretically, each new animal or plant extinction, with all its dimly perceived and intertwined affects, could cause total ecosystem collapse and human extinction. Each new extinction increases the risk of disaster. Like a mechanic removing, one by one, the rivets from an aircraft's wings, [hu]mankind may be edging closer to the abyss.

### 1nc

**Development and economic engagement policies are economic imperialism hidden by benevolence ---this encourages countervailing forces which turn the case.**

**Veltmeyer, ’11** - Professor of Development Studies at the Universidad Autónoma de Zacatecas in Mexico and Professor of Sociology and International Development Studies at St. Mary’s University, (Henry, “US imperialism in Latin America: then and now, here and there,” estudios críticos del desarrollo, vol. I, núm. 1, segundo semestre de 2011, pp. 89–123, http://estudiosdeldesarrollo.net/critical/rev1/3.pdf)//A-Berg

Finding itself in the wake of a second world war as the dominant economic power in the «free world» the US strove assiduously to consolidate this power at the level of foreign policy. Under prevailing conditions that included the potential threat posed by the USSR and the fallout from a spreading and unstoppable decolonization movement in the economically backward areas of the world, United States (US) policymakers decided on, and actively pursued, a foreign policy with three pillars. One of these pillars was a strategy of economic reconstruction of an economically devastated Europe and the capitalist development of the economies and societies on the periphery of the system. A second pillar of the post–war order was what would become known as the «Bretton woods system», composed of three institutions (a Bank of Economic Reconstruction and Development—the World Bank today; the International Monetary fund; and a General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade that would morph into the WTO 50 years on) and the mechanism of the US dollar, based on a fixed gold standard, as the currency of international trade.1 The third pillar was would become the United Nations—a system of international organizations designed to provide the necessary conditions of (capitalist) development and collective security, a system of multilateral conflict resolution. The motivating force behind this foreign policy was clear enough: to advance the geopolitical and economic interests of the US as a world power, including considerations of profit and strategic security (to make the world save for US investments and to reactivate a capital accumulation process). It was to be an empire of free trade and capitalist development, plus democracy where possible, a system of capitalist democracies backed up by a system of international organizations dominated by the US, a military alliance (NATO) focused on Europe in the protection of US interests and collective security, and a more global network of military bases to provide logistical support for its global military apparatus. Within the institutional framework of this system and international order the US was particularly concerned to consolidate its power and influence in Latin America and the Caribbean, regarded by policymakers and many politicians as a legitimate sphere of undue influence—the exercise of state power in the «national interest». This chapter will elaborate on economic and political dynamics of the efforts pursued by the US to pursue these interests via the projection of state power—and the resulting «informal empire» constructed by default. US IMPERIALISM IN LATIN AMERICA—FORMS AND DYNAMICS The US has always been imperialistic in its approach to national development in Latin America, but in the wake of World War II the situation that it found itself in—commanding, it is estimated, half of the world’s industrial capacity and 80% of its financial resources; and already an occupying power of major proportions3—awakened in US policymaking circles and its foreign policy establishment its historic mission regarding the Americas and also the dream of world domination, provoking the quest to bring it about in the preferred form of an «informal empire». A key strategy to this purpose was to institute the rules for what would later be termed «global governance»—for securing its economic and geopolitical strategic intents in a world liberated from colonial rule (id est competing empires). The resulting world order, dubbed Bretton Woods I by some,4 provided an institutional framework for advancing the geopolitical strategic interests of the US in the context of a «cold war» waged against the emerging power of the USSR, and for advancing cooperation for international development, a policy designed to ensure that the economically backward countries seeking to liberate themselves from the yoke of European colonialism would not succumb to the siren of communism, that they would undertake a nation–building and development process on a capitalist path. This development project required the US to assume the lead but also share power with its major allies, strategic partners in a common enterprise organised as the OECD and a united Europe,6 with a system of United Nations institutions to provide a multilateral response to any security threats (and that prevented any one country for embarking on the path of world domination via unilateral action. This was the price that the US had to pay for national security under conditions of an emerging threat presented by the USSR—soviet communism backed up by what was feared to be a growing if not commanding state power. In this context the US began to construct its empire, and it did so on a foundation of six pillars: 1. Consolidation of the liberal capitalist world order, renovating it on neoliberal lines in the early 1980s when conditions allowed; 2. A system of military bases strategically across the world, to provide thereby the staging point and logistics for the projection of military power when needed, and rule by military force when circumstances would dictate; 3. A project of cooperation for international development, to provide financial and technical assistance to countries and regimes willing to sign on the project—to provide a safe haven for US economic interests and pave the way for the expansion of capitalism and democracy, the bulwarks of US imperialism; 4. Implementation of a neoliberal agenda of policy reforms—to adjust the macroeconomic and development policies to the requirements of a new world order in which the forces of freedom would be released from the constraints of the welfare–development state; 5. Regional integration—construction of regional free trade agreements to cooperate with, and not discriminate against, US economic interests regarding international trade; 6. Globalization—the integration of economies across the world into the global economy in a system designed to give maximum freedom to the operating units of the global empire. Each strategy not only served as a pillar of imperial policy but provided the focal point for the projection of state power in different forms as circumstances required or permitted. Together they constituted what might be termed imperialism. Each element of the system was, and is, dynamic in its operations but ultimately unstable because of the countervailing forces that they generated. Within ruling class circles in the US since at least 2000 there is an open acceptance that theirs is an imperial state and that the US should maintain or act to restore its dominant position in the 21st century by any means available, and certainly by force if need be. The whole tenor of the debate in the past two decades over US foreign policy, Mann (2007) notes, is framed in these terms. In this connection, Richard Hass, the current director of Policy Planning in e State Department, wrote an essay in November 2000 advocating that the US adopt an «imperial» feign policy. He defined this as «a foreign policy that attempts to organise the world along certain principles affecting relations between states and conditions within them». This would not be achieved through colonization or colonies but thorough what he termed «informal control» based on a «good neighbour policy» backed up by military force if and when necessary—harking back to the «informal empire» of a previous era (McLean, 1995; Roorda, 1998). Mechanisms such as international financial markets and structural reforms in macroeconomic policy, and agencies such as the World Bank, the WTO and the IMF, would work to ensure the dominance of US interests, with the military iron fist backing up the invisible hand of the market and any failure in multilateral security arrangements. This system of «economic imperialism», maintained by US hegemony as leader of the «free world» (representing the virtues of capitalist democracy), was in place and fully functioning from the 1950s throughout 1980s and the reign of Ronald Reagan. In the 1990s, with the disappearance of the threat of the Soviet Union and international communism, this system of economic imperialism, bed as it was on the hegemony of «democracy and freedom» as well multilateralism in international security arrangements, did not as much break down as it was eclipsed by the emergence of the «new imperialism» based on the unilateral projection of military force as a means of securing world domination in «the American century».7 This conception of a «new imperialism», a «raw imperialism» that would not «hesitate to use [coercive] force if, when and where necessary» (Cooper, 2000), based on «aggressive multilateralism» or the unilateral projection, and strategic use, of state power including emphatic military force, was advanced in neoconservative circles over years of largely internal debate, and put into practice by a succession of regimes, both democratic and republican. It achieved its consummate form in George W. Bush’s White House, in the Gang of Four (Donald Rumsfeld, Paul Wolfowitz, Condoleeza Rice, Dick Cheney),8 and its maximum expression in a policy of imperial war in the Middle east and the Gulf region. Although the US also projected its military power in other theatres of imperial war such Yugoslavia9 and Colombia (viz. the covert Colombia– centered class war «on subversives» against the FARC–EP’ overt regional «war on drugs») the policy of imperial war and the strategy of military force were primarily directed towards the Gulf region (see, inter alia, Petras and Veltmeyer, 2003). In the academic world the issue as to the specific or dominant form taken by imperialism has not been generally framed as a matter of when and under what circumstances military force might be needed or legitimately used (generlly seen as a «last resort» but as the necessary part of the arsenal of force available to the state, conceived of as the only legitimate repository of the use of violence in the «national interest»). Rather, the issue of armed force in the imperialist projection of military power has been framed in terms of an understanding, or the argument. That an imperial order cannot be maintained by force and coercion; it requires «hegemony», which is to say, acquiescence by the subalterns of imperial power achieved by a widespread belief in e legitimacy of that power generated by an overarching myth or dominant ideology—the idea of freedom in the post world war II context of the «cold war» against communism and the idea of globalization in the new imperial order established in the 1980s. Power relations of domination and subordination, even when backed up by coercive or armed force, invariably give rise to resistance, and are only sustainable if and when they are legitimated by an effective ideology—ideas of «democracy» and «freedom» in the case of the American empire or «globalization» in the case of the economic imperialism that came into play in the 1990s.

#### The impact is cultural extinction

**Escobar 95** - Distinguished Professor of Anthropology, UNC-Chapel Hill

(Arturo, “Encountering Development: The Making and Unmaking of the Third World,” pg. 52-54)//BB

The crucial threshold and transformation that took place in the early post– World War II period discussed in this chapter were the result not of a radical epistemological or political breakthrough but of the reorganization of a number of factors that allowed the Third World to display a new visibility and to irrupt into a new realm of language. This new space was carved out of the vast and dense surface of the Third World, placing it in a field of power. Underdevelopment became the subject of political technologies that sought to erase it from the face of the Earth but that ended up, instead, multiplying it to infinity.¶ Development fostered a way of conceiving of social life as a technical problem, as a matter of rational decision and management to be entrusted to that group of people—the development professionals—whose specialized knowledge allegedly qualified them for the task. Instead of seeing change as a process rooted in the interpretation of each society's history and cultural tradition—as a number of intellectuals in various parts of the Third World had attempted to do in the 1920s and 1930s (Gandhi being the best known of them)—these professionals sought to devise mechanisms and procedures to make societies fit a preexisting model that embodied the structures and functions of modernity. Like sorcerers' apprentices, the development professionals awakened once again the dream of reason that, in their hands, as in earlier instances, produced a troubling reality.¶ At times, development grew to be so important for Third World countries that it became acceptable for their rulers to subject their populations to an infinite variety of interventions, to more encompassing forms of power and systems of control; so important that First and Third World elites accepted the price of massive impoverishment, of selling Third World resources to the most convenient bidder, of degrading their physical and human ecologies, of killing and torturing, of condemning their indigenous populations to near extinction; so important that many in the Third World began to think of themselves as inferior, underdeveloped, and ignorant and to doubt the value of their own culture, deciding instead to pledge allegiance to the banners of reason and progress; so important, finally, that the achievement of development clouded the awareness of the impossibility of fulfilling the promises that development seemed to be making.¶ After four decades of this discourse, most forms of understanding and representing the Third World are still dictated by the same basic tenets. The forms of power that have appeared act not so much by repression but by normalization; not by ignorance but by controlled knowledge; not by humanitarian concern but by the bureaucratization of social action. As the conditions that gave rise to development became more pressing, it could only increase its hold, refine its methods, and extend its reach even further. That the materiality of these conditions is not conjured up by an “objective” body of knowledge but is charted out by the rational discourses of economists, politicians, and development experts of all types should already be clear. What has been achieved is a specific configuration of factors and forces in which the new language of development finds support. As a discourse, development is thus a very real historical formation, albeit articulated around an artificial construct (underdevelopment) and upon a certain materiality (the conditions baptized as underdevelopment), which must be conceptualized in different ways if the power of the development discourse is to be challenged or displaced.¶ To be sure, there is a situation of economic exploitation that must be recognized and dealt with. Power is too cynical at the level of exploitation and should be resisted on its own terms. There is also a certain materiality of life conditions that is extremely preoccupying and that requires great effort and attention. But those seeking to understand the Third World through development have long lost sight of this materiality by building upon it a reality that like a castle in the air has haunted us for decades. Understanding the history of the investment of the Third World by Western forms of knowledge and power is a way to shift the ground somewhat so that we can start to look at that materiality with different eyes and in different categories.¶ The coherence of effects that the development discourse achieved is the key to its success as a hegemonic form of representation: the construction of the poor and underdeveloped as universal, preconstituted subjects, based on the privilege of the representers; the exercise of power over the Third World made possible by this discursive homogenization (which entails the erasure of the complexity and diversity of Third World peoples, so that a squatter in Mexico City, a Nepalese peasant, and a Tuareg nomad become equivalent to each other as poor and underdeveloped); and the colonization and domination of the natural and human ecologies and economies of the Third World. [26](http://www.questia.com/reader/action/gotoDocId/103228006)¶ Development assumes a teleology to the extent that it proposes that the “natives” will sooner or later be reformed; at the same time, however, it reproduces endlessly the separation between reformers and those to be reformed by keeping alive the premise of the Third World as different and inferior, as having a limited humanity in relation to the accomplished European. Development relies on this perpetual recognition and disavowal of difference, a feature identified by Bhabha (1990) as inherent to discrimination. The signifiers of “poverty”, “illiteracy,” “hunger,” and so forth have already achieved a fixity as signifieds of “underdevelopment” which seems impossible to sunder. Perhaps no other factor has contributed to cementing the association of “poverty” with “underdevelopment” as the discourse of economists. To them I dedicate the coming chapter.

#### The alternative is to vote negative --- rejecting imperialism in this round serves as a starting point to theorize anti-imperialism and break down hegemonic systems of knowledge.

**Morrissey 11 –** (John, Department of Geography, National University of Ireland, 2011, “Architects of Empire: The Military–Strategic Studies Complex and the Scripting of US National Security,” Antipode Vol. 43, (2):435-470, http://aran.library.nuigalway.ie/xmlui/handle/10379/2893)//a-berg

As an academic working in political geography, a key starting point of resistancefor me is the careful detailing of the largely unseen inner workings of empire in our contemporary world, ultimately in order to be better able to resist it (which is what this paper has been about). That resistance can manifest itself in counter-scriptings in a variety of contexts, from lecture halls to town halls, from academic journals to online blogs. And in a variety of public forums, many geographers have played, and continue to play, important roles in critiquing the war on terror and advancing more nuanced, reasoned and humane geographies and histories of Islam and the Middle East (Gregory 2005). Such academic and public intellectual work can also crucially liaise with, learn from, and be transformed by grassroots activists in peace and social justice movements throughout the world.44 And linking to their work in our teaching especially has more power than perhaps we sometimes realise; especially given the multimedia teaching and learning tools available today.45 A recent Antipodespecial issue saw a number of insightful reflections on the possibilities of “practising public scholarship” [volume 40(3), 2008]. The contributors outline various ways in which critical geographies can support and enable political and social activism. In addition, Don Mitchell makes an important point in reminding us thatacademic “intellectual” and “bureaucratic” work are also “vital parts of any activism” (Mitchell 2008:448). Disrupting and countering the abstracted geopolitical scriptings of strategic studies can take on a variety of forms. But both inside and outside the academy, a key intellectual task, I think, is theorizing anti-imperialism— both historically and in our contemporary moment. Effective counterdiscourses for our time must surely incorporate the lessons learned from the anti-imperial/anti-colonial struggles of history—from Ireland to India, from Algeria to Vietnam. Appellations like “insurgents” do the same discursive work today as the historical preference “rebels” did in reductively demonizing whole populations and delegitimizing their right to resistance. But more importantly, perhaps, they serve too to disengage us from unpacking the discourses and practices of contemporary anti-imperialism. Yet historical contexts of resistance have much to offer if our endgame is articulating critical and humane geographies of our contemporary world. And this is a crucial challenge, given the sheer pervasiveness of strategic geopolitical discourses that negate human geographical realities. Such scriptings are not only intellectually unconvincing; they are dangerous and hugely consequential. In seeking to avoid dangerously reductive accounts of the world, geography for me has always had a particular responsibility and strength. In understanding conflict, past and present, discourse has perpetually played a troubled role. In reading the current proliferation of “geopolitical discourse”, it is useful to bear in mind history’smultiple reminders of the impossibilities of “colonial discourse” (Morrissey 2010). There is a need to spatialize and locate the material and corporeal geographies of war; not just its imaginative geographies. The spaces and agency of resistance or so-called “insurgency” in the war on terror, for example, are little theorized and frequently not even recognized; reflecting a power relations of knowledge familiar to any student of colonial history. This remains a key challenge for critical accounts of our contemporary geopolitical world. That said, however, connectingwhat James Sidaway calls the “banal geopolitics” of militarism to its brutal consequences will always be an urgent task too (Sidaway 2001, 2008). And the dots can be joined. The military–strategic studies complex in contemporary America is a powerful producer of banal geopolitics, patronized and prioritized geographical knowledge and ultimately actionable geostrategic intelligence. Its experts and advocates are both architects of empire and apologists for its consequences. Their dominant national security discourse is about positing legitimized, aggressive US military action against the threat of irrational terrorism emanating from the Middle East; it is about presenting the USA as the guardian of global economic health; and it is about imperial ambition too. This paper has sought to expose the military–strategic studies complex as playing a central role in support of that imperial ambition and in the advancement of its aggressive geopolitics. I hope it has signalled too the imperative of resistance. In the face of ubiquitous scriptings of insecurity, war and geopolitics in our contemporary world, the task of both exposing the geoeconomic stakes and insisting on real places with real people, with bodies and rights just like us, is as urgent as ever.

### leadership

#### No impact to heg.

**Fettweis 11** Christopher J. Fettweis, Department of Political Science, Tulane University, 9/26/11, Free Riding or Restraint? Examining European Grand Strategy, Comparative Strategy, 30:316–332, EBSCO

It is perhaps worth noting that there is no evidence to support a direct relationship between the relative level of U.S. activism and international stability. In fact, the limited data we do have suggest the opposite may be true. During the 1990s, the United States cut back on its defense spending fairly substantially. By 1998, the United States was spending $100 billion less on defense in real terms than it had in 1990.51 To internationalists, defense hawks and believers in hegemonic stability, this irresponsible “peace dividend” endangered both national and global security. “No serious analyst of American military capabilities,” argued Kristol and Kagan, “doubts that the defense budget has been cut much too far to meet America’s responsibilities to itself and to world peace.”52 On the other hand, if the pacific trends were not based upon U.S. hegemony but a strengthening norm against interstate war, one would not have expected an increase in global instability and violence. The verdict from the past two decades is fairly plain: The world grew more peaceful while the United States cut its forces. No state seemed to believe that its security was endangered by a less-capable United States military, or at least none took any action that would suggest such a belief. No militaries were enhanced to address power vacuums, no security dilemmas drove insecurity or arms races, and no regional balancing occurred once the stabilizing presence of the U.S. military was diminished. The rest of the world acted as if the threat of international war was not a pressing concern, despite the reduction in U.S. capabilities. Most of all, the United States and its allies were no less safe. The incidence and magnitude of global conflict declined while the United States cut its military spending under President Clinton, and kept declining as the Bush Administration ramped the spending back up. No complex statistical analysis should be necessary to reach the conclusion that the two are unrelated. Military spending figures by themselves are insufficient to disprove a connection between overall U.S. actions and international stability. Once again, one could presumably argue that spending is not the only or even the best indication of hegemony, and that it is instead U.S. foreign political and security commitments that maintain stability. Since neither was significantly altered during this period, instability should not have been expected. Alternately, advocates of hegemonic stability could believe that relative rather than absolute spending is decisive in bringing peace. Although the United States cut back on its spending during the 1990s, its relative advantage never wavered. However, even if it is true that either U.S. commitments or relative spending account for global pacific trends, then at the very least stability can evidently be maintained at drastically lower levels of both. In other words, even if one can be allowed to argue in the alternative for a moment and suppose that there is in fact a level of engagement below which the United States cannot drop without increasing international disorder, a rational grand strategist would still recommend cutting back on engagement and spending until that level is determined. Grand strategic decisions are never final; continual adjustments can and must be made as time goes on. Basic logic suggests that the United States ought to spend the minimum amount of its blood and treasure while seeking the maximum return on its investment. And if the current era of stability is as stable as many believe it to be, no increase in conflict would ever occur irrespective of U.S. spending, which would save untold trillions for an increasingly debt-ridden nation. It is also perhaps worth noting that if opposite trends had unfolded, if other states had reacted to news of cuts in U.S. defense spending with more aggressive or insecure behavior, then internationalists would surely argue that their expectations had been fulfilled. If increases in conflict would have been interpreted as proof of the wisdom of internationalist strategies, then logical consistency demands that the lack thereof should at least pose a problem. As it stands, the only evidence we have regarding the likely systemic reaction to a more restrained United States suggests that the current peaceful trends are unrelated to U.S. military spending. Evidently the rest of the world can operate quite effectively without the presence of a global policeman. Those who think otherwise base their view on faith alone.

#### Chinese influence is not zerosum --- helps the US, and China can’t challenge US influence

**Xiaoxia, 13** – Economic Observer (Wang, “In America’s Backyard: China’s Rising Influence in Latin America”, Worldcrunch, 5/6, http://www.worldcrunch.com/china-2.0/in-america-039-s-backyard-china-039-s-rising-influence-in-latin-america/foreign-policy-trade-economy-investments-energy/c9s11647/)

The global financial crisis of 2008 was a chance for China to become an increasingly important player in Latin American. As Europe and the United States were caught in a financial quagmire, China, with nearly $3 trillion of foreign exchange reserves as backing, embarked on "funds-for-assets" transactions with Latin American countries. So what does China want exactly in entering Latin American? Is it to obtain a stable supply of energy and resources, and thus inadvertently acquire political influence? Or the other way round? Presumably most U.S. foreign policy-makers are well aware of the answer. China's involvement in the Latin American continent doesn’t constitute a threat to the United States, but brings benefits. It is precisely because China has reached "loans-for-oil" swap agreements with Venezuela, Brazil, Ecuador and other countries that it brings much-needed funds to these oil-producing countries in South America. Not only have these funds been used in the field of oil production, but they have also safeguarded the energy supply of the United States, as well as stabilized these countries' livelihood -- and to a certain extent reduced the impact of illegal immigration and the drug trade on the U.S. For South America, China and the United States, this is not a zero-sum game, but a multiple choice of mutual benefits and synergies. Even if China has become the Latin American economy’s new upstart, it is still not in a position to challenge the strong and diverse influence that the United States has accumulated over two centuries in the region.

#### Influence is irrelevant to heg

**Kagan, 06** ([Robert](http://www.carnegieendowment.org/experts/index.cfm?fa=expert_view&expert_id=16&prog=zgp&proj=zusr), senior fellow at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, The Washington Post, 1/15, http://www.carnegieendowment.org/publications/index.cfm?fa=view&id=17894&prog=zgp&proj=zusr)

The striking thing about the present international situation is the degree to which America remains what Bill Clinton once called "the indispensable nation." Despite global opinion polls registering broad hostility to George W. Bush's United States, the behavior of governments and political leaders suggests America's position in the world is not all that different from what it was before Sept. 11 and the Iraq war. The much-anticipated global effort to balance against American hegemony -- which the realists have been anticipating for more than 15 years now -- has simply not occurred. On the contrary, in Europe the idea has all but vanished. European Union defense budgets continue their steady decline, and even the project of creating a common foreign and defense policy has slowed if not stalled. Both trends are primarily the result of internal European politics. But if they really feared American power, Europeans would be taking more urgent steps to strengthen the European Union's hand to check it. Nor are Europeans refusing to cooperate, even with an administration they allegedly despise. Western Europe will not be a strategic partner as it was during the Cold War, because Western Europeans no longer feel threatened and therefore do not seek American protection. Nevertheless, the current trend is toward closer cooperation. Germany's new government, while still dissenting from U.S. policy in Iraq, is working hard and ostentatiously to improve relations. It is bending over backward to show support for the mission in Afghanistan, most notably by continuing to supply a small but, in German terms, meaningful number of troops. It even trumpets its willingness to train Iraqi soldiers. Chancellor Angela Merkel promises to work closely with Washington on the question of the China arms embargo, indicating agreement with the American view that China is a potential strategic concern. For Eastern and Central Europe, the growing threat is Russia, not America, and the big question remains what it was in the 1990s: Who will be invited to join NATO?

#### Hegemony inevitable- power is relative

**Bremmer and Gordon 12/27** (Ian Bremmer is president of Eurasia Group and author of “The End of the Free Market: Who Wins the War Between States and Corporations?” David F. Gordon, former director of policy planning at the State Department, is head of research at Eurasia Group, “An Upbeat View of America's 'Bad' Year”, <http://www.nytimes.com/2011/12/28/opinion/an-upbeat-view-of-americas-bad-year.html?pagewanted=all>, December 27, 2011,

Among global big thinkers, never a bashful crowd, the notion of a United States in decline has become conventional wisdom. In late 2011, this narrative has crescendoed, with experts arguing that China has surpassed the United States economically, Niall Ferguson declaring that we are at “the end of 500 years of Western predominance” and The National Interest proclaiming “the end of the American era.” Even the National Intelligence Council’s coming Global Trends 2030 study reportedly assumes an America in decline. As 2011 draws to a close, the U.S. military’s exit from Iraq and challenges in Afghanistan along with American vulnerability to the European crisis provide further confirmation of the decline narrative. We agree with some of these views. The United States has neither the willingness nor the capability to provide the kind of global leadership that it has provided in the past several decades, and other countries are increasingly less willing to follow America’s lead. But the conventional wisdom obscures as much as it reveals. Specifically, the declinists overlook the inconvenient truth that global power is relative. And comparing America’s year to that of our present and potential adversaries paints an interesting picture: 2011 was not the year when the United States fell off the wagon. Instead, a look back at the past 12 months suggests that U.S. power is more resilient than the narrative of inevitable decline portrays. Take Al Qaeda, our most consistent adversary (by their definition and ours) since the 9/11 attacks. Despite some severe missteps, we have in 10 years degraded Al Qaeda’s capabilities to the point that they are having difficulty mounting attacks against significant targets. In 2011, the United States killed Al Qaeda’s most effective propagandist, Anwar al-Awlaki; its operating chief, Atiyah Abd al-Rahman; and of course its founder, chief executive and spiritual leader, Osama bin Laden. Moreover, the Arab Spring undercut the notion that political change in the Middle East requires the violent jihad that Bin Laden spent his career espousing. The fight against extremist Islam is an impossible one in which to declare success. Yet the fact remains that while Al Qaeda began the War on Terror with a horrific assault on the foremost symbols of U.S. economic and military power, it leaves 2011 effectively leaderless, rudderless and reduced to boasting about kidnapping defenseless U.S. aid workers. Iran’s leaders also exit 2011 in worse shape than they entered it. Early in the year, they viewed the demise of Middle Eastern potentates as accelerating their rise to regional dominance. Turkish anger over the Mavi Marmara incident continued to draw Ankara closer to Tehran. Saudi anger at the perceived lack of U.S. support for Egypt’s Hosni Mubarak seemed to threaten a permanent rupture in the U.S. relationship with a key ally, and Iran assumed that it would be the beneficiary of declining American influence in the Arab World. But the Arab Spring has unfolded very differently. Iran’s closest, most vital, and in some ways only Arab ally, Syria’s Bashar al-Assad, ends the year leading an embattled, isolated regime facing a combination of civil war and economic sanctions that his government is unlikely to survive. Iran’s relationship with Turkey has deteriorated sharply, and, along with Saudi Arabia, Ankara has in fact drawn closer to the United States. Indeed, the nascent U.S.-Turkey-Saudi troika is one of the most important but least noticed trends of the past few months. Combined with another year without nuclear weapons — the program apparently thwarted significantly by covert operations — and a tightening vise of economic sanctions, these events have left Iran’s leaders disoriented. After years of growing consensus, Iran’s elites are now increasingly fragmented and at one another’s throats. Moreover, Tehran spent the past few months engaged in a stunning series of blunders: plotting with Mexican drug dealers to assassinate the Saudi ambassador to the United States and allowing regime supporters to storm the British Embassy in Tehran, the combination of which has re-energized global efforts to squeeze Iran financially. The assumption that Iran is the emerging regional power has shattered. China, which most of the declinists identify as America’s greatest future rival, has likewise had a difficult 2011. With U.S. willingness to lead receding, the international spotlight has fallen on Beijing. And on every issue — the euro zone crisis, climate change and rebalancing the global economy — China has declined to take the lead, to criticism and dismay at home and abroad. Beijing has failed to reconcile rising domestic nationalism with assuaging its neighbors’ increasing alarm over Chinese economic sustainability and strategic hegemony. China’s miscalculations in Northeast and Southeast Asia have allowed the United States to reassert traditional alliances in the region (with Japan and South Korea), establish new beachheads (placing a permanent U.S. Marine Corps presence in Australia), and create a process and institutions (the Trans-Pacific Partnership) for a balanced Asia–Pacific regional architecture, rather than one dominated by the Middle Kingdom. Compared to this, 2011 has not been a bad year for America. It is a stretch to call the Iraq war a victory, but the endgame in the Afghan quagmire is slowly coming into focus. And for all our fiscal problems, global funding has to flow somewhere, and our capital markets are still unparalleled. China won’t internationalize the renminbi, the euro is fragile and gold is not a country. As a result, the dollar remains the world’s reserve currency, and U.S. Treasury bills the global financial safe haven. This will inevitably change in the long term, but not for quite some time. The unipolar moment is over. But for 2011 at least, the world order has remained the United States and the rest.

### trade

#### No bioterrorism and no impact

**Mueller 10** [John, Woody Hayes Chair of National Security Studies at the Mershon Center for International Security Studies and a Professor of Political Science at The Ohio State University, A.B. from the University of Chicago, M.A. and Ph.D. @ UCLA, Atomic Obsession – Nuclear Alarmism from Hiroshima to Al-Qaeda, Oxford University Press]

Properly developed and deployed, biological weapons could potentially, if thus far only in theory, kill hundreds of thousands, perhaps even millions, of people. The discussion remains theoretical because biological weapons have scarcely ever been used. For the most destructive results, they need to be dispersed in very low-altitude aerosol clouds. Since aerosols do not appreciably settle, pathogens like anthrax (which is not easy to spread or catch and is not contagious) would probably have to be sprayed near nose level. Moreover, 90 percent of the microorganisms are likely to die during the process of aerosolization, while their effectiveness could be reduced still further by sunlight, smog, humidity, and temperature changes. Explosive methods of dispersion may destroy the organisms, and, except for anthrax spores, long-term storage of lethal organisms in bombs or warheads is difficult: even if refrigerated, most of the organisms have a limited lifetime. Such weapons can take days or weeks to have full effect, during which time they can be countered with medical and civil defense measures. In the summary judgment of two careful analysts, delivering microbes and toxins over a wide area in the form most suitable for inflicting mass casualties-as an aerosol that could be inhaled-requires a delivery system of enormous sophistication, and even then effective dispersal could easily be disrupted by unfavorable environmental and meteorological conditions.

#### No protectionism- international empirics prove.

**Dadush et al 11** (May. Uri, senior associate and director in Carnegie’s new International Economics Program, currently focuses on trends in the global economy and the global financial crisis, previously served as the World Bank’s director of international trade and before that as director of economic policy. He also served as the director of the Bank’s world economy group, leading the preparation of the Bank’s flagship reports on the international economy, Shimelse Ali, economist, Carnegie’s International Economics Program, Rachel Esplin Odell, junior fellow in Carnegie’s Asia Program, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, “Is Protectionism Dying?”, <http://www.carnegieendowment.org/files/is_protectionism_dying.pdf> Pismarov)

Despite a limited increase in the incidence of protectionist measures during the recent financial and economic crisis, the effects on global trade appear small—the world, remarkably, did not resort to protectionism. In addition to the concerted stimulus measures, financial rescues, and the strengthening of lender-of-last-resort facilities that restricted the duration and depth of the economic downturn, the World Trade Organization’s disciplines, enforceable through its dispute settlement mechanism, no doubt played an important role .in staving off trade protection But this is only one part of the story. The increased resistance to protectionism is the result of a complex, mutually reinforcing set of legal and structural changes in the world economy that have made a return to protection more: costly and disruptive and have established new vested interests in open markets. These changes include National disciplines: Along with autonomous liberalization and a generally robust rule of law in the largest trading countries—which improve the • confidence of importers and exporters—national trade tribunals help prevent protectionism by providing a mechanism whereby individual firms can contest protectionist measures that impact their company. Many national governments have also developed explicit or implicit mechanisms for countering protectionism and ensuring that trade policy reflects the general interest Regional and bilateral agreements: In addition to codifying further tariff reductions, regional trade agreements—now covering over half of world • trade—contain provisions establishing dispute settlement mechanisms that parties can use to contest violations of the agreement and thereby defend against protectionism. Furthermore, such agreements have often established regular high-level dialogues on trade disputes, treaty implementation, and further liberalization, providing a mechanism for resolving serious violations of the agreement even if its formal juridical mechanisms are not utilized Facts on the ground”: The political resistance to backsliding on liberalization is stronger because trade has become more prevalent and inextricably woven into production and consumption patterns. The change in the political economy of protectionism is manifested in the increased interest of retailers and consumers in imports, the internationalization of production, and the rise of intra firm trade. Limiting trade in any one sector not only hurts those consumers, retailers, and firms that depend on imports for inputs, but also has repercussions for firms that operate both vertically (within a sector) and horizontally (across sectors) that depend on complex global production chains.

#### Cuban econ resilient – remittances, tourism, oil, and diversification

**Messa-Lago, 13** – Professor Emeritus of Economics and Latin American Studies at the University of Pittsburgh (Carmelo, “The possible impact of the death of Chavez in the Cuban economy”, 12/03/2013, http://www.cubaencuentro.com/cuba/articulos/el-posible-impacto-de-la-muerte-de-chavez-en-la-economia-cubana-283444, translated from Spanish by Google Translate)//eek

If substantially reduce or end Venezuelan aid (equivalent to more than a fifth of the Cuban GDP), the economic crisis in Cuba would be very strong but somewhat lower than the crisis of the 90s for several reasons: an income of $ 2,800 million for the foreign tourists was meager in 1990 foreign remittances which amount is not true but it is estimated between $ 2,000 and $ 3,000, which were much lower in 1990; 350,000 Cuban-Americans visiting the island each year and spend substantial resources; Cuba also produces more oil than in 1990 but still relies on 62% of imports, and finally there is now a more diversified trade partners in 1990 (42% versus 65% Venezuela with the USSR). Even with these palliatives, the blow would be powerful and Cubans would suffer another crisis similar to the Special Period. Raul Castro has sought alternative sources of trade and investment with other countries but not yet achieved substantial results.

#### Alt cause - current Cuban economic model prohibits FDI

**Feinberg 11** - professor of international political economy at UC San Dieg, nonresident senior fellow with the Latin America Initiative at Brookings (Richard E., “Reaching Out: Cuba’s New Economy and the International Response”, November, Brookings, http://www.brookings.edu/~/media/research/files/papers/2011/11/18%20cuba%20feinberg/1118\_cuba\_feinberg.pdf)//ID

Despite these advances, the Cuban economy remains in the doldrums (as described in Section 1) . The main constraint slowing the Cuban economy is not U.S. sanctions (even as they have hit hard). Rather, it is Cuba’s own outdated economic model, inherited from the Soviet Union, of central planning . Cuba’s many commercial partners would like to invest more in Cuba and would prefer to purchase more Cuban exports to correct the imbalances in their bilateral trade accounts, but are frustrated by Cuba’s scant economic offerings.

# 2nc

#### This outweighs – a crisis focused ethic is wrong – attention to isolated instances of warfare ignores the daily horrors of structural violence. This is the precondition for any war to happen

**Cuomo 96** – PhD, University of Wisconsin-Madison, Department of Philosophy, University of Cincinnati (Chris, Hypatia Fall 1996. Vol. 11, Issue 3, pg 30)

In "Gender and `Postmodern' War," Robin Schott introduces some of the ways in which war is currently best seen not as an event but as a presence (Schott 1995). Schott argues that postmodern understandings of persons, states, and politics, as well as the high-tech nature of much contemporary warfare and the preponderance of civil and nationalist wars, render an eventbased conception of war inadequate, especially insofar as gender is taken into account. In this essay, I will expand upon her argument by showing that accounts of war that only focus on events are impoverished in a number of ways, and therefore feminist consideration of the political, ethical, and ontological dimensions of war and the possibilities for resistance demand a much more complicated approach. I take Schott's characterization of war as presence as a point of departure, though I am not committed to the idea that the constancy of militarism, the fact of its omnipresence in human experience, and the paucity of an event-based account of war are exclusive to contemporary postmodern or postcolonial circumstances.(1) Theory that does not investigate or even notice the omnipresence of militarism cannot represent or address the depth and specificity of the everyday effects of militarism on women, on people living in occupied territories, on members of military institutions, and on the environment. These effects are relevant to feminists in a number of ways because military practices and institutions help construct gendered and national identity, and because they justify the destruction of natural nonhuman entities and communities during peacetime. Lack of attention to these aspects of the business of making or preventing military violence in an extremely technologized world results in theory that cannot accommodate the connections among the constant presence of militarism, declared wars, and other closely related social phenomena, such as nationalistic glorifications of motherhood, media violence, and current ideological gravitations to military solutions for social problems. Ethical approaches that do not attend to the ways in which warfare and military practices are woven into the very fabric of life in twenty-first century technological states lead to crisis-based politics and analyses. For any feminism that aims to resist oppression and create alternative social and political options, crisis-based ethics and politics are problematic because they distract attention from the need for sustained resistance to the enmeshed, omnipresent systems of domination and oppression that so often function as givens in most people's lives. Neglecting the omnipresence of militarism allows the false belief that the absence of declared armed conflicts is peace, the polar opposite of war. It is particularly easy for those whose lives are shaped by the safety of privilege, and who do not regularly encounter the realities of militarism, to maintain this false belief. The belief that militarism is an ethical, political concern only regarding armed conflict, creates forms of resistance to militarism that are merely exercises in crisis control. Antiwar resistance is then mobilized when the "real" violence finally occurs, or when the stability of privilege is directly threatened, and at that point it is difficult not to respond in ways that make resisters drop all other political priorities. Crisis-driven attention to declarations of war might actually keep resisters complacent about and complicitous in the general presence of global militarism. Seeing war as necessarily embedded in constant military presence draws attention to the fact that horrific, state-sponsored violence is happening nearly all over, all of the time, and that it is perpetrated by military institutions and other militaristic agents of the state. Moving away from crisis-driven politics and ontologies concerning war and military violence also enables consideration of relationships among seemingly disparate phenomena, and therefore can shape more nuanced theoretical and practical forms of resistance. For example, investigating the ways in which war is part of a presence allows consideration of the relationships among the events of war and the following: how militarism is a foundational trope in the social and political imagination; how the pervasive presence and symbolism of soldiers/warriors/patriots shape meanings of gender; the ways in which threats of state-sponsored violence are a sometimes invisible/sometimes bold agent of racism, nationalism, and corporate interests; the fact that vast numbers of communities, cities, and nations are currently in the midst of excruciatingly violent circumstances. It also provides a lens for considering the relationships among the various kinds of violence that get labeled "war." Given current American obsessions with nationalism, guns, and militias, and growing hunger for the death penalty, prisons, and a more powerful police state, one cannot underestimate the need for philosophical and political attention to connections among phenomena like the "war on drugs," the "war on crime," and other state-funded militaristic campaigns. I propose that the constancy of militarism and its effects on social reality be reintroduced as a crucial locus of contemporary feminist attentions, and that feminists emphasize how wars are eruptions and manifestations of omnipresent militarism that is a product and tool of multiply oppressive, corporate, technocratic states.(2) Feminists should be particularly interested in making this shift because it better allows consideration of the effects of war and militarism on women, subjugated peoples, and environments. While giving attention to the constancy of militarism in contemporary life we need not neglect the importance of addressing the specific qualities of direct, large-scale, declared military conflicts. But the dramatic nature of declared, large-scale conflicts should not obfuscate the ways in which military violence pervades most societies in increasingly technologically sophisticated ways and the significance of military institutions and everyday practices in shaping reality. Philosophical discussions that focus only on the ethics of declaring and fighting wars miss these connections, and also miss the ways in which even declared military conflicts are often experienced as omnipresent horrors. These approaches also leave unquestioned tendencies to suspend or distort moral judgement in the face of what appears to be the inevitability of war and militarism.

#### Critical praxis outweighs policy making --- voting affirmative guarantees error replication. Only a radical break from dominant paradigms can avoid a self-fulfilling prophecy

**Cheeseman & Bruce 1996** (Graeme, Senior Lecturer at the University of New South Wales, and Robert, Associate Professor in social sciences at Curtin university, “Discourses of Danger & Dread Frontiers”, p. 5-8, MT)

This goal is pursued in ways which are still unconventional in the intellectual milieu of international relations in Australia, even though they are gaining influence worldwide as traditional modes of theory and practice are rendered inadequate by global trends that defy comprehension, let alone policy. The inability to give meaning to global changes reflects partly the enclosed, elitist world of professional security analysts and bureaucratic experts, where entry is gained by learning and accepting to speak a particular, exclusionary language. The contributors to this book are familiar with the discourse, but accord no privileged place to its ‘knowledge form as reality’ in debates on defence and security. Indeed, they believe that debate will be furthered only through a long overdue critical re-evaluation of elite perspectives. Pluralistic, democratically-oriented perspectives on Australia’s identity are both required and essential if Australia’s thinking on defence and security is to be invigorated.¶ This is not a conventional policy book; nor should it be, in the sense of offering policy-makers and their academic counterparts sets of neat alternative solutions, in familiar language and format, to problems they pose. This expectation is in itself a considerable part of the problem to be analysed. It is, however, a book about policy, one that questions how problems are framed by policy-makers. It challenges the proposition that irreducible bodies of real knowledge on defence and security exist independently of their ‘context in the world’, and it demonstrates how security policy is articulated authoritatively by the elite keepers of that knowledge, experts trained to recognize enduring, universal wisdom. All others, from this perspective, must accept such wisdom or remain outside the expert domain, tainted by their inability to comply with the ‘rightness’ of the official line. But it is precisely the official line, or at least its image of the world, that needs to be problematised. If the critic responds directly to the demand for policy alternatives, without addressing this image, he or she is tacitly endorsing it. Before engaging in the policy debate the critics need to reframe the basic terms of reference. This book, then, reflects and underlines the importance of Antonio Gramsci and Edward Said’s ‘critical intellectuals’.15¶ The demand, tacit or otherwise, that the policy-maker’s frame of reference be accepted as the only basis for discussion and analysis ignores a three thousand year old tradition commonly associated with Socrates and purportedly integral to the Western tradition of democraticdialogue. More immediately, it ignores post-seventeenth century democratic traditions which insist that a good society must have within it some way of critically assessing its knowledge and the decisions based upon that knowledge which impact upon citizens of such a society. This is a tradition with a slightly different connotation in contemporary liberal democracies which, during the Cold War, were proclaimed different and superior to the totalitarian enemy precisely because there were institutional checks and balances upon power.¶ In short, one of the major differences between ‘open societies’ and their (closed) counterparts behind the Iron Curtain was that the former encouraged the critical testing of the knowledge and decisions of the powerful and assessing them against liberal democratic principles. The latter tolerated criticism only on rare and limited occasions. For some, this represented the triumph of rational-scientific methods of inquiry and techniques of falsification. For others, especially since positivism and rationalism have lost much of their allure, it meant that for society to become open and liberal, sectors of the population must be independent of the state and free to question its knowledge and power. Though we do not expect this position to be accepted by every reader, contributors to this book believe that critical dialogue is long overdue in Australia and needs to be listened to. For all its liberal democratic trappings, Australia’s security community continues to invoke closed monological narratives on defence and security.¶ This book also questions the distinctions between policy practice and academic theory that inform conventional accounts of Australian security. One of its major concerns, particularly in chapters 1 and 2, is to illustrate how theory is integral to the practice of security analysis and policy prescription. The book also calls on policy-makers, academics and students of defence and security to think critically about what they are reading, writing and saying; to begin to ask, of their work and study, difficult and searching questions raised in other disciplines; to recognise, no matter how uncomfortable it feels, that what is involved in theory and practice is not the ability to identify a replacement for failed models, but a realisation that terms and concepts – state sovereignty, balance of power, security, and so on – are contested and problematic, and that the world is indeterminate, always becoming what is written about it. Critical analysis which shows how particular kinds of theoretical presumptions can effectively exclude vital areas of political life from analysis has direct practical implications for policy-makers, academics and citizens who face the daunting task of steering Australia through some potentially choppy international waters over the next few years.¶ There is also much of interest in the chapters for those struggling to give meaning to a world where so much that has long been taken for granted now demands imaginative, incisive reappraisal. The contributors, too, have struggled to find meaning, often despairing at the terrible human costs of international violence. This is why readers will find no single, fully formed panacea for the world’s ills in general, or Australia’s security in particular. There are none. Every chapter, however, in its own way, offers something more than is found in orthodox literature, often by exposing ritualistic Cold War defence and security mind-sets that are dressed up as new thinking. Chapters 7 and 9, for example, present alternative ways of engaging in security and defence practice. Others (chapters 3, 4, 5, 6 and 8) seek to alert policy-makers, academics and students to alternative theoretical possibilities which might better serve an Australian community pursuing security and prosperity in an uncertain world. All chapters confront the policy community and its counterparts in the academy with a deep awareness of the intellectual and material constraints imposed by dominant traditions of realism, but they avoid dismissive and exclusionary terms which often in the past characterized exchanges between policy-makers and their critics. This is because, as noted earlier, attention needs to be paid to the words and the thought processes of those being criticized. A close reading of this kind draws attention to underlying assumptions, showing they need to be recognized and questioned. A sense of doubt (in place of confident certainty) is a necessary prelude to a genuine search for alternative policies. Firstcomes an awareness of the need for new perspectives, thenspecific policies may follow.¶ As Jim George argues in the following chapter, we need to look not so much at contending policies as they are made for us but at challenging ‘the discursive process which gives [favoured interpretations of “reality”] their meaning and which direct [Australia’s] policy/analytical/military responses’. This process is not restricted to the small, official defence and security establishment huddled around the US-Australian War Memorial in Canberra. It also encompasses much of Australia’s academic defence and security community located primarily though not exclusively within the Australian National University and the University College of the University of New South Wales. These discursive processes are examined in detail in subsequent chapters as authors attempt to make sense of a politics of exclusion and closure which exercises disciplinary power over Australia’s security community. They also question the discourse of ‘regional security’, ‘security cooperation’, ‘peacekeeping’ and ‘alliance politics’ that are central to Australia’s official and academic security agenda in the 1990s. This is seen as an important task especially when, as is revealed, the disciplines of International Relations and Strategic Studies are under challenge from critical and theoretical debates ranging across the social sciences and humanities; debates that are nowhere to be found in Australian defence and security studies. The chapters graphically illustrate how Australia’s public policies on defence and security are informed, underpinned and legitimised by a narrowly-based intellectual enterprise which draws strength from contested concepts of realism and liberalism, which in turn seek legitimacy through policy-making processes. Contributors ask whether Australia’s policy-makers and their academic advisors are unaware of broader intellectual debates, or resistant to them, or choose not to understand them, and why?

#### Their framework arguments make violence inevitable by isolating the K by being outside the acceptable realm of political discourse.

**DuRand 2003** (Dr. Cliff DuRand is Professor Emeritus of Philosophy at Morgan State University in Baltimore, Maryland. This paper was presented February 14, 2003 in a public lecture series sponsored by Biblioteca Publica in San Miguel de Allende, Mexico. http://www.ocf.berkeley.edu/~marto/aip/future.htm, MT)

The main point I want to make about that era is that the climate of fear was deliberately induced by our political elite in order to mobilize a frightened population into supporting its anti-communist crusade. Republicans and Democrats, conservatives and liberals alike sought to purge Leftists from the political life of the nation so there could be no dissenting voices from a Cold War to  protect capitalism and ensure U.S. hegemony in the world. Never mind that a nuclear arms race made us less secure, that in the name of anti-communism our government sought to crush every progressive movement that emerged anywhere in the world, and that the scope of political discourse at home was limited to a narrow range. A fearful population was willing to accept all this and  more. Fear induced an unquestioning, childlike trust in a political elite that promised to protect us from harm. As the 17th century philosopher Thomas Hobbes well understood, those with sufficient fear for their lives, liberties and property will be willing to turn all that over to an all powerful Leviathan in hopes of finding security. The politics of fear has governed our national life ever since. With the end of the Cold War up until 911, there was a hiatus.  Without a communist bogeyman to scare us with anymore, the national security state was faced with a legitimization crisis. How could it justify its interventions  against Third World countries? How could it justify continued high levels of military expenditures? How could it sustain the powers of an imperial presidency? Without  an enemy, without a threat to fear, how could the political elite mobilize public support? Through the 1990s you could see it grasping for a new enemy for us to fear. A  war on drugs was offered as cover for interventions in the Andean countries and in Panama, even though the problem of drugs had its roots here at home. We were  told to fear crime (at a time when crime rates were actually decreasing) so we would support draconian police and sentencing practices that have given us the  highest prison population in the industrial world. But the most ludicrous of all was the propaganda campaign launched by the Pentagon to try to convince us that we  were threatened by a possible asteroid that could crash into the earth, destroying all life. To protect against that, we needed to develop space laser weapons that  could destroy an oncoming asteroid first. Thus did the military-industrial complex seek to frighten us into supporting the development of star wars weaponry.  But  none of that could quite do what the political elite needed. Finally, in 2001 on September 11 a spectacular mass terrorist crime gave them a new threat for us to fear.  Quickly interpreting it as an act of war rather than a crime, the most reactionary sector of the elite declared war on an undefined enemy - a war without end. They  offered us something new to fear so we would need the protection they claimed to offer. And they have played the politics of fear masterfully. With frequent alerts,  high visibility security measures, constant reminders of vulnerabilities, an atmosphere of fear has been maintained even in the absence of further real attacks. In his  January 29 State of the Union address, George W. Bush fed our fear with these words: "Imagine those 19 hijackers with other weapons and other plans, this time  armed by Saddam Hussein. It would take one vial, one canister, one crate slipped into this country to bring a day of horror like none we have ever known." The  operative word here is 'imagine.' By fueling a fevered imagination, he promotes a "servile fearfulness", to use Shakespeare's phrase.   This has enabled this reactionary sector of the elite to not only win acceptance of unprecedented regressive policies domestically, with passive acceptance by the rest of the elite, but now push through a war against a country that didn't even have anything to do with terrorism.  Again, we can see how fear can be a potent political force in the hands of skilled political leaders.

#### Case outweighs is the link --- obsession with short-time frame impacts obscures ongoing violence and ecological collapse – we control the root cause of why your conflicts escalate

**Nixon 10** (Rob, Rachel Carson Professor of English, University of Wisconsin-Madison, Slow Violence and the Environmentalism of the Poor, pp 1-14)

When Lawrence Summers, then president of the World Bank, advocated thai the bank develop a scheme to export rich nation garbage, toxic waste, and heavily polluting industries to Africa, he did so in the calm voice of global managerial reasoning.' Such a scheme. Summers elaborated, would help correct an inefficient global imbalance in toxicity. Underlying his plan is an overlooked but crucial subsidiary benefit that he outlined: offloading rich-nation toxins onto the world's poorest continent would help ease the growing pressure from rich-nation environmentalists who were campaigning against garbage dumps and industrial effluent thai they condemned as health threats and found aesthetically offensive. Summers thus rationalized his poison-redistribution ethic as offering a double gain: it would benefit the United States and Europe economically, while helping appease the rising discontent of rich-nation environmentalists. Summers' arguments assumed a direct link between aesthetically unsightly waste and Africa as an out-of-sighl continent, a place remote from green activists' terrain of concern. In Summers' win win scenario for the global North, the African recipients ot his plan were triply discounted: discounted as political agents, discounted as long-term casualties of what 1 call in this book "slow violence," and discounted as cultures possessing environmental practices and concerns of their own. I begin with Summers' extraordinary proposal because it captures the strategic and representational challenges posed by slow violence as it impacts the environments and the environ-mentalism of the poor.¶ Three primary concerns animate this book, chief among them my conviction that we urgently need to rethink—politically, imaginatively, and theoretically what 1 call "slow violence." By slow violence 1 mean a violence that occurs gradually andout of sight, a violence of delayed destruction that is dispersed across time and space, an attritional violence that is typically not viewed as violence at all. Violence is customarily conceived as an event or action that is immediate in time, explosive and spectacular in space, and as erupting into instant sensational visibility. We need, I believe, to engage a different kind of violence, a violence that is neither spectacular nor instantaneous, but rather incremental and accretive, its calamitous repercussions playing out across a range of temporal scales. In so doing, we also need to engage the representational, narrative, and strategic challenges posed by the relative invisibility of slow violence. Climate change, the thawing cryosphere, toxic drift, biomagnification, deforestation, the radioactive aftermath s of wars, acidifying oceans, and a host of other slowly unfolding environmental catastrophes present formidable representational obstacles that can hinder our efforts to mobilize and act decisively. The long dyings the staggered and staggeringly discounted casualties, both human and ecological that result from war's toxic aftermaths or climate change are underrepresented in strategic planning as well as in human memory.¶ Had Summers advocated invading Africa with weapons of mass destruction, his proposal would have fallen under conventional definitions of violence and been perceived as a military or even an imperial invasion. Advocating invading countries with mass forms of slow-motion toxicity, however, requires rethinking our accepted assumptions of violence to include slow violence. Such a rethinking requires that we complicate conventional assumptions about violence as a highly visible act that is newsworthy because it is event focused, time bound, and body bound. We need to account for how the temporal dispersion of slow violence affects the way we perceive and respond to a variety of social afflictions from domestic abuse to posttraumatic stress and. in particular, environmental calamities. A major challenge is representational: how to devise arresting stories, images, and symbols adequate to the pervasive but elusive violence of delayed effects. Crucially, slow violence is often not just attritional but also exponential, operating as a major threat multiplier; it can fuel long-term, proliferating conflicts in situations where the conditions for sustaining life become increasingly but gradually degraded.¶ Politically and emotionally, different kinds of disaster possess unequal heft. Palling bodies, burning towers, exploding heads, avalanches, volcanoes, and tsunamis have a visceral, eye-catching and page-turning power that tales of slow violence, unfolding over years, decades, even centuries, cannot match. Stories of toxic buildup, massing greenhouse gases, and accelerated species loss due to ravaged habitats arc all cataclysmic, but they are scientifically convoluted cataclysms in which casualties are postponed, often for generations. In an age when the media venerate the spectacular, when public policy is shaped primarily around perceived immediate need, a central question is strategic and representational: how can we convert into image and narrative the disasters that are slow moving and long in the making, disasters that are anonymous and that star nobody, disasters that are attritional and of indifferent interest to the sensation-driven technologies of our image-world? How can we turn the long emergencies of slow violence into stories dramatic enough to rouse public sentiment and warrant political intervention, these emergencies whose repercussions have given rise to some of the most critical challenges of our time?¶ This book's second, related focus concerns the environ mentalism of the poor, for it is those people lacking resources who are the principal casualties of slow violence. Their unseen poverty is compounded hy the invisibility of the slow violence that permeates so many of their lives. Our media bias toward spectacular violence exacerbates the vulnerability of ecosystems treated as disposable by turbo-capitalism while simultaneously exacerbating the vulnerability of those whom Kevin Bale, in another context, has called "disposable people."2 It is against such conjoined ecological and human disposability that we have witnessed a resurgent environmentalist!! of the poor, particularly (though not exclusively) across the so-called global South. So a central issue that emerges is strategic: if the neoliberal era has intensified assaults on resources, it has also intensified resistance, whether through isolated site-specific struggles or through activism that has reached across national boundaries in an effort to build translocal alliances.¶ "The poor" is a compendious category subject to almost infinite local variation as well as to fracture along fault lines of ethnicity, gender, race, class, region, religion, and generation. Confronted with the militarization of both commerce and development, impoverished communities are often assailed by coercion and bribery that test their cohesive resilience. How much control will, say, a poor hardwood forest community have over the mix of subsistence and market strategies it deploys in attempts at adaptive survival? How will that community negotiate competing definitions of its own poverty and long-term wealth when the guns, the bulldozers, and the moneymen arrive? Such communities typically have to patch together threadbare improvised alliances against vastly superior military, corporate, and media forces. As such, impoverished resource rebels can seldom afford to be single-issue activists: their green commitments are seamed through with other economic and cultural causes as they experience environmental threat not as a planetary abstraction but as a set of inhabited risks, some imminent, others obscurely long term.¶ The status of environmental activism among the poor in the global South has shifted significantly in recent years. Where green or environmental discourses were once frequently regarded with skepticism as neocolo-nial. Western impositions inimical to the resource priorities of the poor in the global South, such attitudes have been tempered by the gathering visibility and credibility of environmental justice movements that have pushed back against an antihuman environmenialism that too often sought (under the banner of universalism) to impose green agendas dominated by rich nations and Western NGOs. Among those who inhabit the front lines of the global resource wars, suspicions that environmentaUsm is another guise of what Andrew Ross calls "planetary management" have not. of course, been wholly allayed.1 But those suspicions have eased somewhat as the spectrum of what counts as environmenialism has broadened. Western activists are now more prone to recognize, engage, and learn from resource insurrections among the global poor that might previously have been discounted as not properly environmental.' Indeed, 1 believe that the fate of environ mentalism—and more decisively, the character of the biosphere itself—will be shaped significantly in decades to come by the tension between what Ramachandra Guha and Joan Martinez-Alier have called "full-stomach' and "empty-belly" environmenialism.'¶ The challenge of visibility that links slow violence to the environmen-talism of the poor connects directly to this hook's third circulating concern—the complex, often vexed figure of the environmental writer-activist. In the chapters that follow 1 address not just literary but more broadly rhetorical and visual challenges posed by slow violence; however, 1 place particular emphasis on combative writers who have deployed their imaginative agility and worldly ardor to help amplify the media marginalized causes of the environmentally dispossessed. I have sought to stress those places where writers and social movements, often in complicated tandem, have stralcgized against attritional disasters that afflict embattled communities. The writers I engage arc geographically wide ranging—from various parts of the African continent, from the Middle East. India, the Caribbean, the United States, and Britain—and work across a variety of forms. Figures like Wangari Maathai. Arundhati Roy. lndra Sinha. Ken Saro-Wiwa, Abdulrah-man Munif. Njabulo Ndebcle, Nadine Gordimer, Jamaica Kincaid, Rachel Carson, and June Jordan are alive to the inhabited impact of corrosive transnational forces, including petro-imperialism. the megadam industry, outsourced toxicity, neocolonial tourism, antihuman conservation practices, corporate and environmental deregulation, and the militarization of commerce, forces that disproportionately jeopardize the livelihoods, prospects, and memory banks of the global poor. Among the writers 1 consider, some have testified in relative isolation, some have helped instigate movements for environmental justice, and yet others, in aligning themselves with preexisting movements, have given imaginative definition to the issues at stake while enhancing the public visibility of the cause.¶ Relations between movements and writers are often fraught and fric-tional. not least because such movements themselves are susceptible to fracture from both external and internal pressures.\* That said, the writers I consider are enraged by injustices they wish to see redressed, injustices they believe they can help expose, silences they can help dismantle through testimonial protest, rhetorical inventiveness, and counterhistories in the face of formidable odds. Most are restless, versatile writers ready to pit their energies against what Edward Said called "the normalized quiet of unseen power."" This normalized quiet is of particular pertinence to the hushed havoc and injurious invisibility that trail slow violence.¶ In this book, I have sought to address our inattention to calamities that are slow and long lasting, calamities that patiently dispense their devastation while remaining outside our flickering attention spans—and outside the purview of a spectacle-driven corporate media. The insidious workings of slow violence derive largely from the unequal attention given to spectacular and unspectacular time. In an age that venerates instant spectacle, slow violence is deficient in the recognizable special effects that fill movie theaters and boost ratings on TV. Chemical and radiological violence, for example, is driven inward, somatized into cellular dramas of mutation that—particularly in the bodies of the poor—remain largely unobserved, undiagnosed, and untreated. From a narrative perspective, such invisible, mutagenic theater is slow paced and open ended, eluding the tidy closure, the containment, imposed by the visual orthodoxies of victory and defeat.¶ Let me ground this point by referring, in conjunction, to Rachel Carson's Silenl Spring and Frantz Fanon's The Wretched of the Earth. In 1962 Silent Spring jolted a broad international public into an awareness of the protracted, cryptic, and indiscriminate casualties inflicted by dichlorodiphenyltrichlo-roethane (DDT). Yet. just one year earlier, Fanon. in the opening pages of Wretched of the Earth, had comfortably invoked DDT as an affirmative metaphor for anticolonial violence: he called for a DDT-filled spray gun to be wielded as a weapon against the "parasites" spread bv the colonials' Christian church." Fanon's drama of decolonization is, of course, studded with the overt weaponry whereby subjugation is maintained {"by dint of a great array of bayonets and cannons") or overthrown ("by the searing bullets and bloodstained knives") after "a murderous and decisive struggle between the two protagonists."' Yet his temporal vision of violence—and of what Aime Cesaire called "the rendezvous of victory"—was uncomplicated by the concerns thai an as-yet inchoate environmental justice movement (catalyzed in part by Silent Spring) would raise about lopsided risks that permeate the land long term, blurring the clean lines between defeat and victory, between colonial dispossession and official national self determination.11 We can ccr lainly read Fanon, in his concern with land as property and as fount of native dignity, retrospectively with an environmental eye. But our theories of violence today must be informed by a science unavailable to Fanon, a science that addresses environmentally embedded violence that is often difficult to source, oppose, and once set in motion, to reverse.¶ Attritional catastrophes that overspill clear boundaries in time and space arc marked above all by displacements temporal, geographical, rhetorical, and technological displacements that simplify violence and underestimate, in advance and in retrospect, the human and environmental costs. Such displacements smooth the way for amnesia, as places are rendered irretrievable to those who once inhabited them, places that ordinarily pass unmourned in the corporate media. Places like the Marshall Islands, subjected between 1948 and 1958 to sixty-seven American atmospheric nuclear "tests," the largest of them equal in force to 1.000 I liroshima-sizcd bombs. In 1950 the Atomic Energy Commission declared the Marshall Islands "by far the most contaminated place in the world," a condition that would compromise independence in the long term, despite the islands' formal ascent in 1979 into the ranks of self-governing nations." The island republic was still in pan governed by an irradiated past: well into the 1980s its history of nuclear colonialism, long forgotten by the colonizers, was still delivering into the world "jellyfish babies"—headless, eyeless, limbless human infants who would live for just a few hours.11¶ If, as Said notes, struggles over geography are never reducible to armed struggle but have a profound symbolic and narrative component as well, and if, as Michael Watts insists, we must attend to the "violent geographies of fast capitalism." we need to supplement both these injunctions with a deeper understanding of the slow violence of delayed effects that structures so many of our most consequential forgetting\*." Violence, above all environmental violence, needs to be seen—and deeply considered—as a contest not only over space, or bodies, or labor, or resources, but also over time. Wc need to bear in mind Faulkner's dictum that "the past is never dead. It's not even past." His words resonate with particular force across landscapes permeated by slow violence, landscapes of temporal overspill that elude rhetorical cleanup operations with their sanitary beginnings and endings.1'1¶ Kwamc Anthony Appiah famously asked. "Is the 'Post-' in "PostcoloniaF the 'Post-' in 'Postmodern'?" As environmentalists wc might ask similarly searching questions of the "post" in postindustrial, post Cold War, and post-conflict." For if the past of slow violence isnevcrpast. so too the post is never fully post: industrial particulates and effluents live on in the environmental elements wc inhabit and in our very bodies, which cpidcmiologically and ecologically are never our simple contemporaries.'" Something similar applies to so-called postconflict societies whose leaders may annually commemorate, as marked on the calendar, the official cessation of hostilities, while ongoing intcrgcncrational slow violence (inflicted by, say. uncxplodcd landmines or carcinogens from an arms dump) may continue hostilities by other means.¶ Ours is an age of onrushing turbo-capitalism, wherein the present feels more abbreviated than it used to—at least for the world's privileged classes who live surrounded by technological time-savers that often compound the sensation of not having enough lime. Consequently, one of the most pressing challenges of our age is how to adjust our rapidly eroding attention spans to the slow erosions of environmental justice. If, under ncoliberalism, the gult between enclaved rich and outcast poor has become ever more pronounced, ours is also an era of enclaved time wherein for many speed has become a sell justifying, propulsive ethic that renders uneventful" violence (to those who live remote from its attritional lethality) a weak claimant on our time. The attosecond pace of our age, with its restless technologies of infinite promise and infinite disappointment, prompts us to keep flicking and clicking distractedly in an insatiable and often insensate — quest for quicker sensation.¶ The oxymoronic notion of slow violence poses a number of challenges; scientific, legal, political, and representational. In the long arc between the emergence of slow violence and its delayed effects, both the causes and the memory of catastrophe readily fade from view as the casualties incurred typically pass untallied and unremembered. Such discounting in turn makes it far more difficult to secure effective legal measures for prevention, restitution, and redress. Casualties from slow violence are moreover, out of sync not only with our narrative and media expectations but also with the swift seasons of electoral change. Politicians routinely adopt a "last in, first out" stance toward environmental issues, admitting them when limes are flush, dumping them as soon as times get tight. Because preventative or remedial environmental legislation typically targets slow violence, it cannot deliver dependable electoral cycle results, even though those results may ultimately be life saving. Relative to bankable pocket-book actions—there'll be a tax rebate check in the mail next August—environmental payouts seem to lurk on a distant horizon. Many politicians—and indeed many voters—routinely treat environmental action as critical yet not urgent. And so generation after generation of two- or four-year cycle politicians add to the pileup of deferrable actions deferred. With rare exceptions, in the domain of slow violence "yes, but not now, not yet" becomes the modus operandi.¶ How can leaders be goaded to avert catastrophe when the political rewards of their actions will not accrue to them but will be reaped on someone else's watch decades, even centuries, from now? How can environmental activists and storytellers work to counter the potent political, corporate, and even scientific forces invested in immediate self-interest, procrastination, and dissembling? We see such dissembling at work, for instance, in the afterword to Michael Crichton's 2004 environmental conspiracy novel, Slate of Fear, wherein he argued that we needed twenty more years of daia gaihcringon climate change before any policy decisions could be ventured.1\* Although the National Academy of Sciences had assured former president George W. Bush that humans were indeed causing the earth to warm. Bush shopped around for views that accorded with his own skepticism and found them in a private meeting with Crichton, whom he described as "an expert scientist.\*'¶ To address the challenges of slow violence is to confront the dilemma Rachel Carson faced almost half a century ago as she sought to dramatize what she eloquently called "death by indirection."'" Carson's subjects were biomagnification and toxic drift, forms of oblique, slow-acting violence that, like climate change, pose formidable imaginative difficulties for writers and activists alike. In struggling to give shape to amorphous menace, both Carson and reviewers of 5ilcn( Spring resorted to a narrative vocabulary: one reviewer portrayed the book as exposing "the new, unplottcd and mysterious dangers wc insist upon creating all around us,"" while Carson herself wrote of "a shadow that is no less ominous because it is formless and obscure."10 To confront slow violence requires, then, that we plot and give figurative shape to formless threats whose fatal repercussions are dispersed across space and time. The representational challenges are acute, requiring creative ways of drawing public attention to catastrophic acts that are low in instant spectacle but high in long-term effects. To intervene representation-ally entails devising iconic symbols that embody amorphous calamities as well as narrative forms that infuse those symbols with dramatic urgency.¶ Seven years after Rachel Carson turned our attention to ihe lethal mechanisms of "death by indirection," Johan Gaining, the influential Norwegian mathematician and sociologist, coined the term "indirect or structural violence."'' Gakung's theory of structural violence is pertinent here because some of his concerns overlap with the concerns that animate this book, while others help throw inio relief the rather different features I have soughi to highlight by introducing the term "slow violence." Structural violence, forGaltung, stands in opposition to the more familiar personal violence thai dominates our conceptions of what counts as violence per sc." Galtung was concerned, as I am, with widening the field of what constitutes violence. He soughi to foreground ihe vast structures thai can give rise to acts of personal violence and constitute forms of violence in and of themselves. Such structural violence may range from the unequal morbidity that results from a commodificd health care system, to racism itself. What I share with Gal-tung's line of thought is a concern with social justice, hidden agency, and certain forms of violence that are imperceptible.¶ In these terms, for example, we can recognize that the structural violence embodied by a neoliberal order of austerity measures, structural adjustment, rampant deregulation, corporate megamergers, and a widening gulf between rich and poor is a form of covert violence in its own right that is often a catalystfor more recognizably overt violence. For an expressly environmental example of structural violence, one might cite Wangari Maathai's insistence that the systemic burdens of national debt to the IMF and World Bank borne by many so-called developing nations constitute a major impediment to environmental sustainability.JI So. too, feminist earth scientist Jill Schneiderman, one of our finest thinkers about environmental time, has written about the way in which environmental degradation may "masquerade as inevitable."14¶ For all the continuing pertinence of the theory of structural violent t and for all the modifications the theory has undergone, the notion bears the impress of its genesis during the high era of structuralist thinking that tended toward a static determinism. We see this, for example, in Gakung's insistence that "structural violence is silent, it does not show—its is essentially static, it is the tranquil waters."1\* In contrast to the static connotations of structural violence, I have sought, through the notion of slow violence, to foreground questions of time, movement, and change, however gradual. The explicitly temporal emphasis of slow violence allows us to keep front and center the representational challenges and imaginative dilemmas posed not just by imperceptible violence but by imperceptible change whereby vio lence is decoupled from its original causes by the workings of time. Time becomes an actor in complicated ways, not least because the temporal tern plates of our spectacle-driven, 24/7 media life have shifted massively since Galtung first advanced his theory of structural violence some forty years ago. To talk about slow violence, then, is to engage directly with our contemporary politics of speed.¶ Simply put. structural violence is a theory that entails rethinking different notions of causation and agency with respect to violent effects. Slow violence, by contrast, might well include forms of structural violence, but has a wider descriptive range in calling attention, not simply to questions of agency, but to broader, more complex descriptive categories of violence enacted slowly over time. The shift in the relationship between human agency and time is most dramatically evident in our enhanced understanding of the accelerated changes occurring at two scalar extremes—in the life-sustaining circuits of planetary biophysics and in the wired brain's neural circuitry. The idea of structural violence predated both sophisticated contemporary ice-core sampling methods and the emergence of cyber technology. My concept of slow violence thus seeks to respond both to recent, radical changes in our geological perception and our changing technological experiences of time.¶ Let me address the geological aspect first. In 2000, Paul Crutzen. the Nobel Prize-winning atmospheric chemist, introduced the term "the Anthropo-cene Age" (which he dated to James Watt's invention of the steam engine). Through the notion of "the Anthropocene Age." Crutzen sought to theorize an unprecedented epochal effect: the massive impact by the human species, from the industrial era onward, on our planet's life systems, an impact that, as his term suggests, is geomorphic, equal in force and in long-term implications to a major geological event.\* Crutzen's attempt to capture the epochal scale of human activity's impact on the planet was followed by Will Steffen's elaboration, in conjunction with Crutzen and John McNeill, of what they dubbed the Great Acceleration, a second stage of the Anthropocene Age that they dated to the mid-twentieth century. Writing in 2007. Steffen ct al. noted how "nearly three-quarters of the anthropogenically driven rise in COt concentration has occurred since 1950 (from about 310 to 380 ppm), and about half of the total rise (48 ppm) has occurred in just the last 30 years."-7 The Australian environmental historian Libby Robin has put the case succinctly: "We have recently entered a new geological epoch, the Anthropocene. There is now considerable evidence that humanity has altered the biophysical systems of Earth, not just the carbon cycle . . . but also the nitrogen cycle and ultimately the atmosphere and climate of the whole globe."" What, then, are the consequences for our experience of time of this newfound recognition thai we have inadvertently, through our unprecedented biophysical species power, inaugurated an Anthropocene Age and are now engaged in (and subject to) the hurtling changes of the Great Acceleration?¶ Over the past two decades, this high-speed planetary modification has been accompanied (at least for those increasing billions who have access to the Internet) by rapid modifications to the human cortex. It is difficult, but necessary, to consider simultaneously a geologically-paced plasticity, however relatively rapid, and the plasticity of brain circuits reprogrammed by a digital world that threatens to "info-whelm" us into a state of perpetual distraction. If an awareness of the Great Acceleration is (to put it mildly) unevenly distributed, the experience of accelerated connectivity (and the paradoxical disconnects that can accompany it) is increasingly widespread. In an age of degraded attention spans it becomes doubly difficult yet increasingly urgent that we focus on the toll exacted, over time, by the slow violence of ecological degradation. We live, writes Cory Doctorow, in an era when the electronic screen has become an "ecosystem of interruption technologies.''" Or as former Microsoft executive Linda Stone puts it, we now live in an age of "continuous partial attention.?" Fast is faster than it used to be, and story units have become concomitantly shorter. In this cultural milieu of digitally speeded up time, and foreshortened narrative, the intergenerational aftermath becomes a harder sell. So to render slow violence visible entails, among other things, redefining speed: we see such efforts in talk of accelerated species loss, rapid climate change, and in attempts to recast "glacial"-once a dead metaphor for "slow-as a rousing, iconic image of unacceptably fast loss. Efforts to make forms of slow violence more urgently visible suffered a setback in the United States in the aftermath of 9/11, which reinforced a spectacular, immediately sensational, and instantly hyper-visible image of what constitutes a violent threat. The fiery spectacle of the collapsing towers was burned into the national psyche as the definitive image of violence, setting back by years attempts to rally public sentiment against climate change, a threat that is incremental, exponential, and far less sensationally visible. Condoleezza Rice's strategic fantasy of a mushroom cloud looming over America if the United States failed to invade Iraq gave further visual definition to cataclysmic violence as something explosive and instantaneous, a recognizably cinematic, immediately sensational, pyrotechnic event. The representational bias against slow violence has, furthermore, a critically dangerous impact on what counts as a casualty in the first place. Casualties of slow violence-human and environmental-are the casualties most likely not to be seen, not to be counted. Casualties of slow violence become light-weight, disposable casualties, with dire consequences for the ways wars are remembered, which in turn has dire consequences for the projected casualties from future wars. We can observe this bias at work in the way wars, whose lethal repercussions spread across space and time, are tidily bookended in the historical record. Thus, for instance, a 2003 New York Times editorial on Vietnam declared that" during our dozen years there, the U.S. killed and helped kill at least 1.5 million people.'?' But that simple phrase "during our dozen years there" shrinks the toll, foreshortening the ongoing slow-motion slaughter: hundreds of thousands survived the official war years, only to slowly lose their lives later to Agent Orange. In a 2002 study, the environmental scientist Arnold Schecter recorded dioxin levels in the bloodstreams of Bien Hoa residents at '35 times the levels of Hanoi's inhabitants, who lived far north of the spraying." The afflicted include thousands of children born decades after the war's end. More than thirty years after the last spray run, Agent Orange continues to wreak havoc as, through biomagnification, dioxins build up in the fatty tissues of pivotal foods such as duck and fish and pass from the natural world into the cooking pot and from there to ensuing human generations. An Institute of Medicine committee has by now linked seventeen medical conditions to Agent Orange; indeed, as recently as 2009 it uncovered fresh evidence that exposure to the chemical increases the likelihood of developing Parkinson's disease and ischemic heart disease." Under such circumstances, wherein long-term risks continue to emerge, to bookend a war's casualties with the phrase "during our dozen years there" is misleading: that small, seemingly innocent phrase is a powerful reminder of how our rhetorical conventions for bracketing violence routinely ignore ongoing, belated casualties.

#### 3. Cloaking DA - The reasons for pursuing a policy are central to understanding it, we must reject liberal reforms that mask the security apparatus by shifting the frame of debate because they effectively kill critique and sustain security logic.

**Burke 2007** (Anthony, Senior Lecturer @ School of Politics & IR @ Univ. of New South Wales, 2007, Beyond Security, Ethics and Violence, p. 1-4, MT)

Working between international relations, philosophy, and political and cultural theory, and with those whose daily suffering is most shocking and unbearable in mind, this book thus brings sustained critical attention to the promises and practices of security, ethics and violence as they manifest themselves in the statecraft, foreign policy, diplomacy, terrorism, war-making, geopolitics and strategy of the last few decades. This book does so to sound a warning: that not only are global patterns of insecurity, violence and conflict getting ever more destructive and out of hand, but that the dominant conceptual and policy frameworks we use to understand and respond to them are deeply inadequate and dangerous. Given this danger, the book insists upon a ‘critical’ approach: one that refuses to accept the representations of the world most available to us and apparently most credible, but instead questions the very categories we have used to understand and shape our modernity and its relation to power, violence and existence. Hence none of these things – ethics, violence, security or war – are taken for granted, as if we know what they are and how they fit together. Rather this is a book that asks about the kind of violence that war is, that we think and allow it to be; that asks about the kind of ethics that relates to security and violence, that by turns condemns, demands or exonerates killing; that asks about the violence that we think enables, defends or threatens security; and that asks about the security that conjures violence from its soul, which pushes kindness or cruelty or murder through its veins like a life-giving fluid. It asks if violence is really as rational, ethical and controllable as we believe; if a security that hinges upon violence is tenable or meaningful, and if it can be refigured; and it asks if ethics can offer us a path beyond violence or is in danger of becoming reduced to it. While a concern with ethics, as both a source of hope and danger, is a central theme of the book, it is not based on an approach that brings ‘ethics’, as a fully formed and systematic body of principles, to something that lies outside it: ‘security’, ‘war’ or ‘international relations’. Rather it interrogates the very practical and conceptual structure of these processes, along with ethical 4 reasoning itself, in order to understand the ethical outcomes of various approaches to security and violence even when they claim to be governed by the demands of ethics. Nor are ethics, security and violence the limit of this book’s concerns. It puts significant related ideas under scrutiny: sovereignty, freedom, identity and power. These frameworks are interrogated at the level both of their theoretical conceptualisation and their practice: in their influence and implementation in specific policy contexts and conflicts in East and Central Asia, the Middle East and the 'war on terror', where their meaning and impact take on greater clarity. This approach is based on a conviction that the meaning of powerful political concepts cannot be abstract or easily universalised: they all have histories, often complex and conflictual; their forms and meanings change over time; and they are developed, refined and deployed in concrete struggles over power, wealth and societal form. While this should not preclude normative debate over how political or ethical concepts should be defined and used, and thus be beneficial or destructive to humanity, it embodies a caution that the meaning of concepts can never be stabilised or unproblematic in practice. Their normative potential must always be considered in relation to their utilisation in systems of political, social and economic power and their consequent worldly effects. Hence this book embodies a caution by Michel Foucault, who warned us about the 'politics of truth . . the battle about the status of truth and the economic and political role it plays', and it is inspired by his call to 'detach the power of truth from the forms of hegemony, social, economic and cultural, within which it operates at the present time'. It is clear that traditionally coercive and violent approaches to security and strategy are both still culturally dominant, and politically and ethically suspect. However, the reasons for pursuing a critical analysis relate not only to the most destructive or controversial approaches, such as the war in Iraq, but also to their available (and generally preferable) alternatives. There is a necessity to question not merely extremist versions such as the Bush doctrine, Indonesian militarism or Israeli expansionism, but also their mainstream critiques - whether they take the form of liberal policy approaches in international relations (IR), just war theory, US realism, optimistic accounts of globalisation, rhetorics of sensitivity to cultural difference, or centrist Israeli security discourses based on territorial compromise with the Palestinians. The surface appearance of lively (and often significant) debate masks a deeper agreement about major concepts, forms of political identity and the imperative to secure them. Debates about when and how it may be effective and legitimate to use military force in tandem with other policy options, for example, mask a more fundamental discursive consensus about the meaning of security, the effectiveness of strategic power, the nature of progress, the value of freedom or the promises of national and cultural identity.  As a result, political and intellectual debate about insecurity, violent conflict and global injustice can become hostage to a claustrophic structure of political and ethical possibility that systematically wards off critique.

#### 4. Crowd out DA --- they still think that the 1AC is necessary which means the perm prevents epistemological self-reflection which is key to prevent error replication

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It could be suggested that the present risk-oriented preoccupation with symptoms is itself symptomatic of IR’s insufficient self-reflection on its own role in this problem. Despite the normative emphasis on ensuring national and international security, the literature’s overwhelming preoccupation with gauging the multiplicity of ways in which ecological, energy and economic crises might challenge security in coming decades provides very little opening in either theory or policy to develop more effective strategies to mitigate or prevent these heightened security challenges. On the contrary, for the most part, these approaches tend to highlight the necessity to maximise national political–military and international regimes’ powers so that states might be able to respond more robustly in the event that new threats like resource wars and state failure do emerge. But the futility of this trajectory is obvious – a preoccupation with ‘security’ ends up becoming an unwitting accomplice in the intensification of insecurity. The extent of orthodox IR theory’s complicity in this predicament is evident in its reduction of inter-state relations to balance-of-power dynamics, despite a lack of determinate bases by which to define and delineate the dynamics of material power. While orthodox realism focuses inordinately on a military–political conceptualisation of national power, conventional attempts to extend this conceptualisation to include economic dimensions (including the role of transnational corporations) – as well as production, finance, ideas and institutions beyond the state – do not solve the problem.75This Weberian proliferation of categorisations of the multiple dimensions of power, while useful, lacks a unifying explanatory order of determination capable of rendering their interconnections intelligible. As Rosenberg shows in his analysis of the dynamics of distinctive geopolitical orders from Rome to Spain – and Teschke in his exploration of the changing polities of continental Europe from the eighth to the eighteenth centuries – these orders have always been inseparably conjoined with their constitutive relations of production as structured in the context of prevailing social– property relations, illustrating the mutually-embedded nature of ‘economic’ and ‘extra-economic’ power.76In contrast, orthodox IR axiomatically fragments the ‘economic’ and ‘extra-economic’ (and the latter further into ‘military’, ‘political’, ‘cultural’, etc.) into separate, autonomous spheres with no grasp of the scope of their interconnection.77 It also dislocates both the state, and human existence as such, from their fundamental material conditions of existence, in the form of their relationship to the biophysical environment, as mediated through relations of production, and the way these are governed and contested through social–property relations.78By externalising the biophysical environment – and thus human metabolism with nature – from state praxis, orthodox IR simply lacks the conceptual categories necessary to recognise the extent to which socio-political organisational forms are mutually constituted by human embeddedness in the natural world.79While further fragmenting the international into a multiplicity of disconnected state units whose behaviour can only be analysed through the limited lenses of anarchy or hierarchy, orthodox IR is incapable of situating these units in the holistic context of the global political economy, the role of transnational capitalist classes, and the structural pressures thereby exerted on human and state behaviour.80

#### Enmity motivated by security will cause extinction; the threats they name aren’t real but are invented by leaders manipulating us.

**Mack 1988** (John E., M.D. an American psychiatrist, writer, and professor at Harvard Medical School. He was a Pulitzer Prize-winning biographer. “The Enemy System” 1988. http://www.johnemackinstitute.org/passport/enemysystem.html, MT)

The threat of nuclear annihilation has stimulated us to try to understand what it is about mankind that has led to such self-destroying behavior. Central to this inquiry is an exploration of the adversarial relationships between ethnic or national groups. It is out of such enmities that war, including nuclear war should it occur, has always arisen. Enmity between groups of people stems from the interaction of psychological, economic, and cultural elements. These include fear and hostility (which are often closely related), competition over perceived scarce resources,[3] the need for individuals to identify with a large group or cause,[4] a tendency to disclaim and assign elsewhere responsibility for unwelcome impulses and intentions, and a peculiar susceptibility to emotional manipulation by leaders who play upon our more savage inclinations in the name of national security or the national interest. A full understanding of the "enemy system"[3] requires insights from many specialities, including psychology, anthropology, history, political science, and the humanities. In their statement on violence[5] twenty social and behavioral scientists, who met in Seville, Spain, to examine the roots of war, declared that there was no scientific basis for regarding man as an innately aggressive animal, inevitably committed to war. The Seville statement implies that we have real choices. It also points to a hopeful paradox of the nuclear age: threat of nuclear war may have provoked our capacity for fear-driven polarization but at the same time it has inspired unprecedented efforts towards cooperation and settlement of differences without violence. The Real and the Created Enemy: Attempts to explore the psychological roots of enmity are frequently met with responses on the following lines: "I can accept psychological explanations of things, but my enemy is real. The Russians [or Germans, Arabs, Israelis, Americans] are armed, threaten us, and intend us harm. Furthermore, there are real differences between us and our national interests, such as competition over oil, land, or other scarce resources, and genuine conflicts of values between our two nations. It is essential that we be strong and maintain a balance or superiority of military and political power, lest the other side take advantage of our weakness". This argument does not address the distinction between the enemy threat and one's own contribution to that threat-by distortions of perception, provocative words, and actions. In short, the enemy is real, but we have not learned to understand how we have created that enemy, or how the threatening image we hold of the enemy relates to its actual intentions. "We never see our enemy's motives and we never labor to assess his will, with anything approaching objectivity".[6] Individuals may have little to do with the choice of national enemies. Most Americans, for example, know only what has been reported in the mass media about the Soviet Union. We are largely unaware of the forces that operate within our institutions, affecting the thinking of our leaders and ourselves, and which determine how the Soviet Union will be represented to us. Ill-will and a desire for revenge are transmitted from one generation to another, and we are not taught to think critically about how our assigned enemies are selected for us. In the relations between potential adversarial nations there will have been, inevitably, real grievances that are grounds for enmity. But the attitude of one people towards another is usually determined by leaders who manipulate the minds of citizens for domestic political reasons which are generally unknown to the public. As Israeli sociologist Alouph Haveran has said, in times of conflict between nations historical accuracy is the first victim.[8] The Image of the Enemy and How We Sustain It: Vietnam veteran William Broyles wrote: "War begins in the mind, with the idea of the enemy."[9] But to sustain that idea in war and peacetime a nation's leaders must maintain public support for the massive expenditures that are required. Studies of enmity have revealed susceptibilities, though not necessarily recognized as such by the governing elites that provide raw material upon which the leaders may draw to sustain the image of an enemy.[7,10] Freud[11] in his examination of mass psychology identified the proclivity of individuals to surrender personal responsibility to the leaders of large groups. This surrender takes place in both totalitarian and democratic societies, and without coercion. Leaders can therefore designate outside enemies and take actions against them with little opposition. Much further research is needed to understand the psychological mechanisms that impel individuals to kill or allow killing in their name, often with little questioning of the morality or consequences of such actions. Philosopher and psychologist Sam Keen asks why it is that in virtually every war "The enemy is seen as less than human? He's faceless. He's an animal"." Keen tries to answer his question: "The image of the enemy is not only the soldier's most powerful weapon; it is society's most powerful weapon. It enables people en masse to participate in acts of violence they would never consider doing as individuals".[12] National leaders become skilled in presenting the adversary in dehumanized images. The mass media, taking their cues from the leadership, contribute powerfully to the process. The image of the enemy as less than human may be hard to dislodge. For example, a teacher in the Boston area reported that during a high school class on the Soviet Union a student protested: "You're trying to get us to see them as people". Stephen Cohen and other Soviet experts have noted how difficult it is to change the American perception of the Soviet Union, despite the vast amount of new information contradicting old stereotypes." Bernard Shaw in his preface to *Heartbreak House*, written at the end of World War I, observed ironically: "Truth telling is not compatible with the defense of the realm". Nations are usually created out of the violent defeat of the former inhabitants of a piece of land or of outside enemies, and national leaders become adept at keeping their people's attention focused on the threat of an outside enemy.[14] Leaders also provide what psychiatrist Vamik Volkan called "suitable targets of externalization"[10] – i.e., outside enemies upon whom both leaders and citizens can relieve their burdens of private defeat, personal hurt, and humiliation.[15] All-embracing ideas, such as political ideologies and fixed religious beliefs act as psychological or cultural amplifiers. Such ideologies can embrace whole economic systems, such as socialism or capitalism, or draw on beliefs that imply that a collectivity owes its existence to some higher power in the universe. It was not Stalin as an individual whom Nadezhda Mandelstam blamed for the political murder of her poet husband Osip and millions of other citizens but the "craving for an all-embracing idea which would explain everything in the world and bring about universal harmony at one go”.[16] Every nation, no matter how bloody and cruel its beginnings, sees its origins in a glorious era of heroes who vanquished less worthy foes. One's own race, people, country, or political system is felt to be superior to the adversary's, blessed by a less worthy god. The nuclear age has spawned a new kind of myth. This is best exemplified by the United States' strategic defense initiative. This celestial fantasy offers protection from attack by nuclear warheads, faith here being invested not in a god but in an anti-nuclear technology of lasers, satellites, mirrors, and so on in the heavens.Individual Group Linkages and Lessons in Childhood: To find out the source of hatred or antagonism we need to understand the complex relationship between the psychology of the individual, and the national group.[17] We can start by examining how enmity develops in childhood. In the first year of life a child begins to have a sense of self,[18] which includes the ability to distinguish between familiar people with whom he or she feels comfortable and those who are strangers or are felt to be alien. The small child's ability to distinguish between friends and strangers[19] is accompanied by thought patterns that tend to divide people and things into good and bad, safe and unsafe. It is out of such primitive thinking that the structures of enmity later grow. In the second year the child learns that ill-will directed towards those upon whom he is dependent is dangerous to his own well-being. He develops, therefore, mechanisms such as displacement and externalization which allow him to disown such negative impulses. Grandparents and parents may pass on to their children stories of the designated enemy groups' evil actions so that chosen displacements persist from one generation to another. From the drawings and comments of children in Germany, the United States, Central America, and Samoa, Hesse showed that by age five a child understands the idea of an enemy, which he or she will depict as whatever in the culture seems most immediately fearful or threatening-a monster, wild animal, or bad man.[20] By age eight a child understands that "the idea of the enemy" has to do with an unfriendly relationship. But this idea does not usually become cast in political terms until age ten to twelve. It is noteworthy that Hesse's research children, including the older ones, tend not to see their own country as bad or responsible for bad actions. The small child's sense of helplessness is accompanied by a feeling of vulnerability and awareness of dependence on others. The formation of relationships or alliances with other individuals and groups, beginning with family members and extending to the neighborhood, classroom, school playground, and teenage youth group, is an important strategy for gaining a sense of power. Such alliances are the prototype for later political relationships. All of these primitive, or child-like, mechanisms provide fertile soil for political leaders in real life interethnic or international conflicts. Nationalistic slogans and media manipulation focus the child's mind (or the child-mind of the adult) on the peoples or system he is supposed to hate or fear (Jews, Arabs, capitalists, or communists). In the United States patriotic recruitment is accompanied by commercial profiteering-for example, robotic war toys designed to kill communists.[21] The extraordinary dimensions of the nuclear threat have also spawned examples of apocalyptic thinking, in which the world is divided into forces of good and evil, and the belief that, in the event of a nuclear holocaust, the good would be saved and the evil would perish. In such thinking the primitive, polarizing tendencies of the child's mind are all too evident. Creating a Safer World: Hesse's finding that even older children do not perceive their own country's responsibility for states of enmity is in accord with those of psychologists and social scientists - that there is no self-awareness or self-responsibility at the political level which corresponds to the awareness of personal responsibility with which we are familiar in a clinical setting." In political life, the assignment of blame, disclaiming of responsibility, and the denial of one's own nation's contribution to tensions and enmity are the norm.[23] The first task, therefore, is to apply the insights of the behavioral sciences to create a new expectation of political self-responsibility. Nuclear weapons have connected all the peoples of the earth. Not only the nuclear superpowers but also all peoples are now interdependent and mutually vulnerable. Nations may have conflicting values but they cannot afford to have enemies. Education in elementary and secondary schools that reflects this new reality should be our highest priority. Instead of constant blaming of the other side, we need to give new attention to the adversary's culture and history, to his real intentions as well as his hopes, dreams, and values. To understand is not to forgive, but awareness and knowledge could lead to a more realistic appreciation of who has contributed what to the problems and tensions that exist in the world. Young people should be taught in their homes and schools how to identify and resist ideological propaganda. In the nuclear age we need to redefine hackneyed ideas such as national security or the national interest. just as we can no longer afford enemies, there is no longer such a notion as national security. The security of each depends on the other, and the communication of this reality must become a major focus of our educational system.

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#### This outweighs on timeframe and irreversibility – total human extinction

**Walsh 10.** Bryan, “Wildlife: A Global Convention on Biodiversity Opens in Japan, But Can It Make a Difference?” Ecocentric Blog @ TIME, <http://ecocentric.blogs.time.com/2010/10/18/wildlife-a-global-convention-on-biodiversity-opens-in-japan-but-can-it-make-a-difference/#ixzz131wU6CSp> //BR

The story of non-human life on the planet Earth over the past few decades is a simple one: loss. While there are always a few bright spots—including the recovery of threatened animals like the brown pelican, thanks to the quietly revolutionary Endangered Species Act—on a planetary scale biodiversity is steadily marching backwards, with extinctions rising and habitat destroyed. Species as diverse as the tiger—less than 3,500 live in the wild today—to tiny frogs could be gone forever if the trends keep heading downwards. In a bitterly ironic twist, back in 2002 the United Nations declared that 2010 would be the international year of biodiversity, and countries agreed to" achieve a significant reduction of the current rate of biodiversity loss at the global, regional and national level," as part of the UN Convention on Biological Diversity (CBD). At this paper in Science shows (download a PDF here), however, the world has utterly failed to reduce the rate of biodiversity loss, and by just about every measurement, things are getting worse all the time. (Read the Global Biodiversity Outlook if you really want to be depressed.) With that cheery backdrop, representatives from nearly 200 nations are meeting in the Japanese city of Nagoya—home to Toyota and not a whole lot else—for the 10th summit of the CBD, where they will set new goals for reducing species loss and slowing habitat destruction. At the very least, they should know how critical the biodiversity challenge is—as Japanese Environment Minister Ryo Matsumoto said in an opening speech: All life on Earth exists thanks to the benefits from biodiversity in the forms of fertile soil, clear water and clean air. We are now close to a 'tipping point' - that is, we are about to reach a threshold beyond which biodiversity loss will become irreversible, and may cross that threshold in the next 10 years if we do not make proactive efforts for conserving biodiversity. Ahmed Djoghlaf, the executive secretary of the CBD, struck an even darker note, reminding diplomats that they were on a clock—and time was running out: Let's have the courage to look in the eyes of our children and admit that we have failed, individually and collectively, to fulfil the Johannesburg promise made by 110 heads of state to substantially reduce the rate of loss of biodiversity by 2010. Let us look in the eyes of our children and admit that we continue to lose biodiversity at an unprecedented rate, thus mortgaging their future. But what will actually come out of the Nagoya summit, which will continue until Oct. 29? Most likely there will be another agreement—a new protocol—outlining various global strategies on sustaining biodiversity and goals on slowing the rate of species loss. (You can download a PDF of the discussion draft document that will be picked over at Nagoya.) It won't be hard for governments to agree on general ambitions for reducing biodiversity loss—who's against saving pandas?—but the negotiations will be much trickier on the question of who will actually pay for a more biodiverse planet? And much as we've seen in international climate change negotiations, the essential divide is between the developed and developing nations—and neither side seems ready to bend. The reality is that much of the world's biodiversity—the most fantastic species and the most complete forests—is found in the poorer, less developed parts of the world. That's in part because the world's poor have been, well, too poor to develop the land around them in the way rich nations have. (There was once a beautiful, undeveloped island off the East Coast of the U.S., with wetlands and abundant forests. It was called Mannahatta. It's a little different now.) As a result, the rural poor—especially in tropical nations—are directly dependent on healthy wildlife and plants in a way that inhabitants of developed nations aren't. So on one hand that makes the poor directly vulnerable when species are lost and forests are chopped down—which often results in migration to thronging urban areas. But on the other, poverty often drives the rural poor to slash-and-burn forests for agriculture, or hunt endangered species to sell for bush meat. Conservation and development have to go hand in hand. That hasn't always been the mantra of the conservation movement—as Rebecca Tuhus-Dubrow writes in Slate, conservation projects in the past sometimes displaced the human inhabitants over a reserve or park, privileging nature over people. But that's changed in recent decades—environmental groups like Conservation International or the Nature Conservancy now spend as much of their time working on development as they do in protecting nature. "Save the people, save the wildlife"—that's the new mantra. The missing ingredient is money—and that's what will be up for debate at Nagoya. As climate change has risen on the international agenda, funding for biodiversity has lagged—the 33 member nations of the Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) donated $8.5 billion for climate change mitigation projects in 2008, but just $3 billion annually for biodiversity. One way to change that could be through "payment for ecosystem services." A biodiverse landscape, intact forests, clean water and air—all of these ebbing qualities of a healthy world are vital for our economies as well. (The Economics of Ecosystems and Biodiversity, a UN-funded study, estimates that nature degradation costs the world $2 trillion to $5 trillion a year, with the poorest nations bearing the brunt of the loss.) Rich countries could pay more biodiverse developing nations to keep nature running—allowing poorer countries to capitalize on their natural resources without slashing and burning. Will that work? I'm skeptical—the experience of climate change negotiations have shown that the nations of the world are great at high ideals and fuzzy goals, but not so hot at actually dividing up the pie in a more sustainable fashion. That doesn't mean there aren't smaller solutions—like Costa Rica's just-announced debt-for-nature deal—but a big bang from Japan this month doesn't seem too likely. The problem is as simple as it is unsolvable, at least so far—there's no clear path to national development so far that doesn't take from the natural world. That worked for rich nations, but we're rapidly running out of planet, as a report last week from the World Wildlife Fund showed. And there's something greater at stake as well, as the naturalist E.O. Wilson once put it: The one process now going on that will take millions of years to correct is the loss of genetic and species diversity by the destruction of natural habitats-this is the folly our descendants are least likely to forgive us. We're losing nature. And that loss really is forever.

#### Environmental leadership key to influence and credibility

**Walker 2** - Chief Economist at the Deutsche Bank Group (Norbert, The New York Times, 8/28/2, Lexis)

At present there is much talk about the unparalleled strength of the United States on the world stage. Yet at this very moment the most powerful country in the world stands to forfeit much political capital, moral authority and international good will by dragging its feet on the next great global issue: the environment. Before long, the administration's apparent unwillingness to take a leadership role -- or, at the very least, to stop acting as a brake -- in fighting global environmental degradation will threaten the very basis of the American supremacy that many now seem to assume will last forever. American authority is already in some danger as a result of the Bush administration's decision to send a low-level delegation to the World Summit on Sustainable Development in Johannesburg -- low-level, that is, relative to America's share of both the world economy and global pollution. The absence of President Bush from Johannesburg symbolizes this decline in authority. In recent weeks, newspapers around the world have been dominated by environmental headlines: In central Europe, flooding killed dozens, displaced tens of thousands and caused billions of dollars in damages. In South Asia, the United Nations reports a brown cloud of pollution that is responsible for hundreds of thousands of deaths a year from respiratory disease. The pollution (80 percent man-made) also cuts sunlight penetration, thus reducing rainfall, affecting agriculture and otherwise altering the climate. Many other examples of environmental degradation, often related to the warming of the atmosphere, could be cited. What they all have in common is that they severely affect countries around the world and are fast becoming a chief concern for people everywhere. Nobody is suggesting that these disasters are directly linked to anything the United States is doing. But when a country that emits 25 percent of the world's greenhouse gases acts as an uninterested, sometimes hostile bystander in the environmental debate, it looks like unbearable arrogance to many people abroad. The administration seems to believe it is merely an observer -- that environmental issues are not its issues. But not doing anything amounts to ignoring a key source of world tension, and no superpower that wants to preserve its status can go on dismissing such a pivotal dimension of political and economic -- if not existential -- conflict. In my view, there is a clear-cut price to be paid for ignoring the views of just about every other country in the world today. The United States is jettisoning its hard-won moral and intellectual authority and perhaps the strategic advantages that come with being a good steward of the international political order. The United States may no longer be viewed as a leader or reliable partner in policymaking: necessary, perhaps inevitable, but not desirable, as it has been for decades. All of this because America's current leaders are not willing to acknowledge the very real concerns of many people about global environmental issues. No one can expect the United States to provide any quick fixes, but one would like to see America make a credible and sustained effort, along with other countries, to address global environmental problems. This should happen on two fronts. The first is at home in the United States, through more environmentally friendly policies, for example greater fuel-efficiency standards for cars and light trucks and better insulation for buildings. The second is international, through a more cooperative approach to multilateral attempts at safeguarding the environment. Simply rejecting international treaties (like the Kyoto Protocol) then failing to offer a better proposal cannot be an acceptable option for American policymakers. Much of the world has come together to help the United States in the fight against terrorism, out of the realization that a common threat can only be beaten through a cooperative effort. It is high time for the United States, metaphorically speaking, to get out of its oversized, gas-guzzling S.U.V. -- and join the rest of the world in doing more to combat global warming and protecting the planet.

#### Castro sees as a precondition – means doesn’t undermine him

**New York Times 11** – (“U.S. Is Urged to Plan to Aid Cuba in Case of an Oil Spill,” 9/9/2011, <http://www.nytimes.com/2011/09/09/world/americas/09cuba.html?_r=0>) //RGP

HAVANA — The United States should urgently make plans for helping Cuba in the event of an offshore oil spill as it prepares to begin exploring fields opposite Florida this year, William Reilly, the co-chairman of a commission that examined the Deepwater Horizon spill, said during a visit here.

Mr. Reilly, who met with Cuban officials, said they were hungry for expertise about offshore oil development and happy to get it from the United States. “It seems to me to be profoundly in the interest of the United States to ensure that, if there should be a spill in Cuban waters, all efforts are undertaken by both government and private entities in the United States to assist in responding,” he said Wednesday.

#### a) Economic engagement specifically must be unconditional – means the perm and CP aren’t topical

**Haass and O’Sullivan, 2k** - \*Vice President and Director of Foreign Policy Studies at the Brookings Institution AND \*\*a Fellow with the Foreign Policy Studies Program at the Brookings Institution (Richard and Meghan, “Terms of Engagement: Alternatives to Punitive Policies” Survival,, vol. 42, no. 2, Summer 2000, http://www.brookings.edu/~/media/research/files/articles/2000/6/summer%20haass/2000survival.pdf

The provision of economic incentives to the private sector of a target country can be an effective mode of ‘unconditional’ engagement, particularly when the economy is not state dominated. In these more open economic climates, those nourished by the exchanges made possible under economic engagement will often be agents for change and natural allies in some Western causes. To the extent that economic engagement builds the private sector and other non-state actors, it is likely to widen the base of support for engagement with America specifically and the promotion of international norms more generally. Certainly, US engagement with China has nurtured sympathetic pockets, if not to American ideals per se, then at least to trade and open economic markets and the maintenance of good relations to secure them. The only constraint on the scope and development of ‘unconditional’ engagement is the range of available collaborators in civil society or the private sector. Fortunately, globalisation and the explosion of economic entities that has accompanied it – while making economic isolation more difficult to achieve – presents a multitude of possible partners for unconditional engagement with non-state actors.

#### b) It severs should

**Summers 94** (Justice – Oklahoma Supreme Court, “Kelsey v. Dollarsaver Food Warehouse of Durant”, 1994 OK 123, 11-8, http://www.oscn.net/applications/oscn/DeliverDocument.asp?CiteID=20287#marker3fn13)

¶4 The legal question to be resolved by the court is whether the word "should"13 in the May 18 order connotes futurity or may be deemed a ruling in praesenti.14 The answer to this query is not to be divined from rules of grammar;15 it must be governed by the age-old practice culture of legal professionals and its immemorial language usage. To determine if the omission (from the critical May 18 entry) of the turgid phrase, "and the same hereby is", (1) makes it an in futuro ruling - i.e., an expression of what the judge will or would do at a later stage - or (2) constitutes an in in praesenti resolution of a disputed law issue, the trial judge's intent must be garnered from the four corners of the entire record.16 ¶ [CONTINUES – TO FOOTNOTE]¶ 13 "Should" not only is used as a "present indicative" synonymous with ought but also is the past tense of "shall" with various shades of meaning not always easy to analyze. See 57 C.J. Shall § 9, Judgments § 121 (1932). O. JESPERSEN, GROWTH AND STRUCTURE OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE (1984); St. Louis & S.F.R. Co. v. Brown, 45 Okl. 143, 144 P. 1075, 1080-81 (1914). For a more detailed explanation, see the Partridge quotation infra note 15. Certain contexts mandate a construction of the term "should" as more than merely indicating preference or desirability. Brown, supra at 1080-81 (jury instructions stating that jurors "should" reduce the amount of damages in proportion to the amount of contributory negligence of the plaintiff was held to imply an *obligation* *and to be more than advisory*); Carrigan v. California Horse Racing Board, 60 Wash. App. 79, 802 P.2d 813 (1990) (one of the Rules of Appellate Procedure requiring that a party "should devote a section of the brief to the request for the fee or expenses" was interpreted to mean that a party is under an *obligation* to include the requested segment); State v. Rack, 318 S.W.2d 211, 215 (Mo. 1958) ("should" would mean the same as "shall" or "must" when used in an instruction to the jury which tells the triers they "should disregard false testimony"). 14 In praesenti means literally "at the present time." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 792 (6th Ed. 1990). In legal parlance the phrase denotes that which in law is presently or immediately effective, as opposed to something that will or would become effective in the future *[in futurol*]. See Van Wyck v. Knevals, 106 U.S. 360, 365, 1 S.Ct. 336, 337, 27 L.Ed. 201 (1882).

#### c) It severs substantial

**Words and Phrases 25**

Judicial and statutory definitions of words and phrases, Volume 7, p. 6738, **1925**

The words “outward, open, actual, visible, substantial, and exclusive,” in connection with a change of possession, mean substantially the same thing. They mean not concealed; not hidden; exposed to view; free from concealment, dissimulation, reserve, or disguise; in full existence; denoting that which not merely can be, but is opposed to potential, apparent, constructive, and imaginary; veritable; genuine; certain; absolute; real at present time, as a matter of fact, not merely nominal; opposed to form; actually existing; true; not including admitting, or pertaining to any others; undivided; sole; opposed to inclusive. Bass v. Pease, 79 Ill. App. 308, 318.

#### New oil development and exploration puts the environment on the brink- CP solves

**Connell 9** – Council of Hemispheric Affairs research associate (Christina, COHA, “The US and Cuba: Destined to be an environmental duo?” 2009, <http://www.coha.org/the-us-and-cuba-an-environmental-duo/>) //RGP

The recent discovery of oil and natural gas reserves in the Florida straits in Cuban waters has attracted foreign oil exploration from China and India, both eager to begin extraction. Offshore oil and gas development could threaten Cuba’s and Florida’s environmental riches. Together, Cuba and the U.S. can develop policies to combat the negative results coming from the exploitation of these resources. The increased extraction and refining of oil in Cuba could have detrimental effects on the environment. Offshore drilling is likely to increase with the discovery of petroleum deposits in the Bay of Cárdenas and related areas. Excavation increases the possibility of oil spills, which would in turn destroy the surrounding ecosystem, including fisheries and coral reef formations. The amount of pollutants released into the air from refining crude oil and the amount of wayward oil residuals would also increase with drilling and extraction. Those conversant with the very sensitive habitat issues are calling for immediate consultations aimed at anticipating what should be done.

#### Conditioning key to enforce environmental protections- unconditional lifting floods Cuba with destructive growth

**Connell 9** – Council of Hemispheric Affairs research associate (Christina, COHA, “The US and Cuba: Destined to be an environmental duo?” 2009, <http://www.coha.org/the-us-and-cuba-an-environmental-duo/>) //RGP

Many Cuba well-wishers fear if President Obama lifts the trade embargo, the invasion of raw capitalism could destroy Cuba’s relatively pristine environment. Although the Cuban government points to its environmental laws and the government agency which was established to develop a sustainable environmental policy, these measures have done little up to now to affect substantial change. In several distinct sectors, Cuba seems to remain unprepared for the lifting of the embargo and the island inevitably could face a flood of investors from the United States and elsewhere, eager to exploit the beautiful landscapes of the island, at great cost and risk. After years of relying on government subsidies and protectionism, this rapid growth could generate irreparable shock waves through the economy. Oliver Houck, a professor at Tulane University who aided the Cuban government in writing its environmental protection provisions, said “an invasion of U.S. consumerism, a U.S.-dominated future, could roll over it (Cuba) like a bulldozer,” when the embargo ends. The wider Caribbean region has experienced water contamination, mangrove destruction and sewage problems due to large quantities of tourists and inadequate plumbing. Therefore, U.S. tourism regulations need to be in place in order to protect the precious ecosystem of the island and prohibit over development. Collaboration between the U.S. and Cuba would be mutually beneficial, as the U.S. could use Cuba as a laboratory of sustainable development and U.S. tourism would stimulate Cuba’s stagnant economy, if its negative impact could be controlled. Both countries must agree upon a mutual plan for development.

#### 2. Sequencing matters – environmental protection must come before lifting the embargo

**Connell 9** – Council of Hemispheric Affairs research associate (Christina, COHA, “The US and Cuba: Destined to be an environmental duo?” 2009, <http://www.coha.org/the-us-and-cuba-an-environmental-duo/>) //RGP

The Environmental Defense Fund (EDF) has conducted research in Cuba since 2000, working with Cuban partners on scientific investigations and strategies for protecting coastal and marine resources. Operating under a special license from the United States government, EDF experts are collaborating with Cuban scientists on research projects aimed at ensuring that if Cuba taps offshore oil and gas reserves, it will be done in an environmentally concious way. The US should establish more partnerships like these as President Obama has the legal authority to institute far-reaching cooperation with Cuba on joint marine environmental projects. These partnerships should be implemented as the first step in creating an elaborate alliance for environmental protection between the two countries. If the embargo is lifted, symbols of meretricious American capitalism are likely to invade the once relatively isolated island. Opinion columnist Cynthia Tucker has commented on such matters: “Mickey Mouse is sure to arrive, bringing with him the aptly predicted full frontal assault of American culture and consumer goods,” suggesting that if Obama lifts the embargo, a functioning system of environmental protection supported by both the U.S. and the Cuban public must be present for the island to be protected. It is Cuba’s lack of development that makes the island attractive to tourists and although tourism boosts the economy, it also could have detrimental effects on the environment. If the embargo is lifted, strict development restrictions need to be in place in order to prevent further environmental exploitation. Currently, without a severe shift in enforcement of environmental laws and the formation of a hard-working U.S.-Cuba partnership, the Caribbean’s most biodiverse island will continue to be damaged. The key to a new dynamic in the U.S.-Cuba relationship might be to embark on a series of strategic actions that aim to establish a bilateral relationship for sustainable development and associated activities based on mutual respect and the autonomy of each country’s sovereignty and traditions.